A Wittgenstein for Postliberal Theologians by Springs, Jason
A WITTGENSTEIN FOR POSTLIBERAL
THEOLOGIANS
JASON A. SPRINGS
Remarkably, the theological discourse surrounding Hans Frei and postliberal theol-
ogy has continued for nearly thirty years since Frei’s death. This is due not only to
the complex and provocative character of Frei’s work, nor only to his influence upon
an array of thinkers who went on to shape the theological field in their own right. It
is just as indebted to the critical responses that his thinking continues to inspire. One
recurrent point of criticism takes aim at Frei’s use of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later
work for theological ends. In his recent book Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great
Divide in Twentieth Century Theology, John Allan Knight challenges what he sees as
Frei’s dependence on problematic Wittgensteinian assumptions.1 This article raises a
few concerns about Knight’s charges against Frei.2 Specifically, I argue that Knight’s
account tends to conflate the work of Wittgenstein and Frei. It does this by underva-
luing two determinative features of Frei’s work: (1) its basic Christological orienta-
tion; and (2) its Christologically motivated use of ad hoc apologetics. I argue that the
Wittgensteinian view that Knight attributes to Frei is not Frei’s view at all, and is,
moreover, a problematic account of Wittgenstein on its own terms. Finally, Knight’s
claim that Frei’s work “depends upon” and “is suffused” with the understanding of
Wittgenstein that Knight attributes to him is based upon an account of Frei’s treat-
ment of the sensus literalis that is not entirely accurate. Without question, Knight
does remarkable service to Frei’s legacy by keeping important debates over his work
alive.3 In what follows, I propose several points where I think Knight’s account
might be further enriched. The result, I hope, will be a more nuanced understanding
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1 John Allan Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth-Century Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
2 In a more recent essay, Knight expands his criticisms to include my own treatment of Frei’s uses of
Wittgenstein’s work. See John Allan Knight, “‘Wittgenstein’s Web’: Hans Frei and the Meaning of Biblical
Narrative,” Journal of Religion 95, no. 3 (July 2015): 295-432. My explication of, and expansion upon, Frei’s
uses of Wittgenstein appear throughout my book, Toward A Generous Orthodoxy: Prospects for Hans Frei’s
Postliberal Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
3 Knight’s book is bold and ambitious. Its argumentative strategy is forcefully and brilliantly engi-
neered. The present essay focuses solely on some of my disagreements with him. I want to emphasize at
the outset that I consider it an excellent book in many regards. Readers unfamiliar with Knight’s project
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of the ways that Frei actually appropriated and deployed Wittgenstein’s thought. I
will contextualize my account of Frei with reference both to Wittgenstein’s writings
and the literature surrounding his writings. Setting forth these accounts in tandem
should help make further available Wittgenstein’s work for subsequent work by
postliberal theologians.
I. What’s the Use in Calling Frei a Wittgensteinian?
To deny that Frei was a “card-carrying Wittgensteinian” does not, Knight insists, clear
him of these indictments. Indeed, Knight suggests, such a denial may be paradoxical.
After all, Frei challenged portrayals of Wittgenstein as forwarding a systematic theory
of meaning, and especially any that could be reduced to the aphorism “meaning is
use.” At the same time, Frei himself was intentionally unsystematic in his use of phi-
losophy, anthropology, and literary theory in his theological work. Therefore, Knight
argues, in this important respect (among others) Frei is thoroughly Wittgensteinian.
For just as Wittgenstein refused systematic theory-building in his later work, so Frei
refused to develop a full-blown theory of meaning (Wittgensteinian or otherwise).
Somewhat ironically, then, Frei’s very refusal to theorize systematically is what
makes Frei Wittgensteinian.4 Indeed, Knight goes on to claim that “Frei’s critique of
liberal theology, his analysis of theological claims, and his own method are thor-
oughly suffused with, and dependent on, the later Wittgenstein’s views on linguistic
meaning.”5
Is this portrayal of Frei as Wittgensteinian accurate? Granted, both the later
Wittgenstein and Frei are unsystematic in their uses of theory. In this regard, the
two share obvious resemblances. At the same time, however, their respective demur-
rals from theoretical system-building, or the adoption of any comprehensive theory,
diverge in fundamental ways.
The value in denying that Frei is a “card-carrying Wittgensteinian” may be clari-
fied by attending more deliberately to the role of Christology in Frei’s work, and to
the nature and character of what Frei called ad hoc apologetics. Though influenced
by both Barth and Wittgenstein (each in different ways), Frei is not concerned to be
“loyal” to either.6 Frei’s motivating and orienting concern is to follow Christ, to be
Christocentric from first to last. Indeed, Frei attended to “the gospel narratives” pre-
cisely because of the Christological orientation of his theology and his central con-
cern to develop and refine a high Christology.7
can find a helpfully lucid synopsis of the argument in Ben Fulford’s review of Liberalism versus
Postliberalism in Journal of Theological Studies 65, no. 1 (2014): 363–367.
4As Knight puts it, “Frei (no doubt intentionally) did not develop any ‘Wittgensteinian theory of
meaning,’ but that very refusal to theorize is shared by Wittgenstein himself” (“Wittgenstein’s Web”,
338).
5 Ibid., 359.
6Nor is Frei concerned to be a “faithful Barthian.” Ibid., 339 and 342. It is true that in his basic
Christological orientation, Frei thought Barth was exemplary in many ways. But Frei distanced himself
from Barth on certain points, and admitted to interpreting Barth in his own way.
7A broad swath of scholars has worked to unpack the orientational centrality of Christology in Frei’s
theology both early and late in his career. For some of the most helpful treatments, see Mike Higton,
“Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory,” Scottish Journal of Theology 50, no. 1
(1997): 83–95; and Higton’s even more thorough exposition of the Christological commitments and moti-
vations driving Frei’s work in Christ, Providence, and History (London: T&T Clark, 2004); see also Charles
Campbell, Preaching Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997); Ben Fulford
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Frei found Barth’s own scripturally grounded Christocentricity compelling. For,
while it refused to predicate theological work upon any univocal, comprehensive
theory, or to build a finalized theological system, neither could it be in any systematic
way anti-theoretical. In fact, it had to be richly and eclectically theoretical. Because
Barth’s work, though oriented by the priority of the scriptural witness to Jesus, had
to draw upon categories, concepts, and theories external to scripture itself, its use of
them would need to be ad hoc and piecemeal. This is not because he privileges the
category called “narrative.” It is because the object of the scriptural witness is the tes-
timony of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ inspired there and then by the Holy
Spirit, and which the Holy Spirit makes luminous here and now. It is for similar
Christological reasons that Frei’s engagement with philosophical resources is ad hoc
and unsystematic. Frei understood such an approach to be required by his effort to
follow Jesus. Throughout his career he sought to maintain a high Christology as his
orientation for engaging scripture and for his exposition of the interwoven-ness of
scriptural witness in church practices. In short, Frei’s work was motivated by
Christology, and not by any concern to take a principled position in a philosophical
debate.8
Conversely, Wittgenstein was not motivated (as Frei was) by Christological con-
cerns. He had no interest (as Frei did) in the conceptual delicacy and fragmentariness
necessitated by, and standing in anticipation of, God’s self-revealing action here and
now. Nor was Wittgenstein concerned to orient his work according to the injunctions
of a subject matter that purports to portray a miracle of grace. Wittgenstein had no
concern (as Frei did) to give orientational priority to the presence of Christ through
the Holy Spirit making the tasks of theology possible. And so, while there are resem-
blances in certain features of their approaches, Wittgenstein and Frei diverge in their
respective motivations, the ends they pursued, and the effects each sought.
But what of Barth’s influence on Frei, which is another central aspect of Knight’s
critique? It is true that Frei’s approach to appropriating theory is one point in which
he was influenced by Barth. However, I suspect that Knight’s portrayal of the
expounds upon the centrality of Frei’s Christology with great clarity in Divine Eloquence and Human
Transformation (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013); George Hunsinger’s exposition of Frei’s
Christology, with attention to its basis and development, appears in his “Afterword: Hans Frei as
Theologian,” in Theology and Narrative (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), and in his article “Frei’s
Early Christology: The Book of Detours,” Pro Ecclesia, 24, no. 1 (2015): 24–36. Hunsinger positions Frei’s
approach within the broader Christological landscape in “The Daybreak of the New Creation: Christ’s
Resurrection in Recent Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 57, no. 2 (May 2004): 163–181. See also my
Toward a Generous Orthodoxy, and “Hans Frei’s Later Christology: Radiance and Obscurity,” Pro Ecclesia,
Vol. 24, no. 1 (2015): 37–52.
8As he wrote in response to Gary Comstock’s pair of articles on his work in the early 1980s (by
whom Frei said he had been upsettingly misunderstood), “I am a Christian theologian and do not regard
philosophy as ever having achieved that clearly demonstrated set of even formal certainties (and agree-
ments) in 2500 years which would allow it the kind of authoritative status you seem to want to accord it;
and yet I believe theology cannot do without philosophy. Furthermore theology cannot even invest so
much in the foundational/anti-foundational debate as to come out (qua theology) in principle on the
anti-foundational side. Christian theologians will have to make use of philosophy, whichever way philos-
ophers decide that particular issue is to be resolved. In other words, I’m saying two things simultane-
ously: First, Christian theology is quite distinct from philosophy . . . Second, despite their mutual
distinctness, theology as a second-order discipline cannot dispense with philosophy, and their relation
remains complex and has constantly to be worked out, rather than being of invariable shape.” See Frei,
“Letter to Gary Comstock,” November 5, 1984,” in Mike Higton and Mark Alan Bowald, eds. Reading
Faithfully, Vol. 1: Writings from the Archives, Theology and Hermeneutics (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2015), 36–41
(here 37).
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content of that influence—the exact character of Frei’s approach—is not entirely cor-
rect. Barth did not claim that philosophical (and other) presuppositions and interpre-
tive implements must arise exclusively from within scripture.9 Barth claimed, rather,
that using insights and presuppositions external to the scriptural witness—as inevita-
bly theologians and readers of scripture must—would need to be re-ordered and ori-
ented by the scriptural witness. This is because the subject matter of the gospels
defied conceptual systematization. “For the Gospel is what it is in the divine-human
person of Jesus Christ himself. And this person does not permit himself to be trans-
lated into a proposition.” Hence, as George Hunsinger clarifies, “The explication of
revelation will thus always be ‘less a system than the report of an event,’ and the
event concerned will have to be understood under a diversified variety of concepts
rather than a unified conceptual scheme.”10
By no means does this accordance of primacy to the logic of scripture prohibit the
use—or even the necessity—of theory in reading, interpreting, and applying scrip-
ture. In fact, just the opposite is true. It recognizes theory’s indispensability.
However, it also frees the theologian to use any theoretical implements that may
help. In fact, it recognizes the need for an eclectic diversity of theoretical implements,
though always Christologically oriented.11 Thus Barth wrote:
There is none [i.e., no philosophy or method] which must become dangerous [to
the scriptural witness], because there is none which we cannot have without pos-
iting it absolutely. There is none which cannot possibly become dangerous,
because there is none which we cannot posit absolutely, that is, in disloyalty to
Scripture erect its presentation into a principle and an end in itself.12
9Knight characterizes Barth’s aim as “deriving theological method from the Word of God,” Knight,
Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 208.
10 George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 53 (citing Barth,
CD I/1, 280).
11 Frei once remarked, “You recall that Barth had said that without some kind of conceptual scheme,
some kind of philosophy or general theory, we simply couldn’t read. It would be a mechanical exercise,
no more than the reiteration of words. . ..[A]pplying a general scheme to specific reading may well be an
ad hoc affair, rather than a matter of systematic or tight correlation between text and readings.” To
explain what this means, Frei quotes Barth at length: “When the interpreter uses the scheme of thought
he brings with him for the apprehension and explanation of what is said to us in Scripture, he must have
a fundamental awareness of what he is doing. We must be clear that every scheme of thought which we
bring with us is different from that of the scriptural word which we have to interpret, for the object of
the latter is God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, it is the testimony of this revelation inspired by the Holy
Ghost, and it can become luminous for us only through the same Holy Ghost” (Frei, Types of Christian
Theology [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992], 85–6 (hereafter Types), quoting Barth, CD, I/2,
730). Frei draws these points from Barth’s detailed exposition of the approach to scriptural interpretation
(“Freedom Under the Word,” CD I/2, 661–740) specifically in the mode of explicatio, meditatio, applicatio
(722–740).
12 Barth, CD, I/2, 732. This reflects one of Barth’s “rules for reading Scripture” that were so central for
Frei’s thinking (see Types, 81–6). It is not fully attending to this point that leads Paul DeHart to portray
Barth as really a “disguised version of Type 5” (very close to what Knight says of Frei) because it alleg-
edly refuses an independence to “generally accepted concepts” (Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the Witnesses:
The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006], 223). For a succinct
account of DeHart’s reconstruction of Frei with attention to this point, see Keith Johnson’s “Review of
Paul Dehart’s The Trial of the Witnesses,” Scottish Journal of Theology, 64, no. 1 (February 2011): 110 – 111;
see also William Placher, “Review of The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology,”
Conversations in Religion and Theology 5 no. 2 (2007): 136–145.
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For Barth, the theologian’s central task in engaging scripture is thus to orient their
use by the centrality of the witness of Christ. This is the account of ad hoc apologetics
that most influenced Frei.13
Thus, reading Frei accurately requires recognizing that to be unsystematically and
eclectically theoretical is not to be “anti-theoretical.” Frei’s work is richly and eclecti-
cally theoretical and thoroughly philosophical. Indeed, Frei insisted that the work of
theology needs philosophy and other cognate disciplines. But this need must always
be configured in ad hoc and unsystematic ways. Why? Again, this is not, as Knight
would have it, because Frei has any principled commitment to following an unsyste-
matic or “ordinary language” reading of Wittgenstein. And it is certainly not because
Frei has a principled philosophical commitment to “the failure of descriptivist or ref-
erential views of linguistic meaning.”14 It is, rather, because Frei is committed to fol-
lowing Jesus. The result is richly and pragmatically theoretical—a theoretical posture
oriented by, and in service to, the interests and purposes of a high Christology.
Yet Frei’s determinative Christological orientation and goal is what Knight’s
account seems to miss. Indeed, in his treatment of Frei, he refers to Frei’s
“Christology” only in passing.15 More significantly, Knight never, so far as I can see,
specifically treats Frei’s career-long effort to develop and maintain a high
Christological center. This is no minor omission.16
Here it is necessary to attend more closely to Knight’s project. What, precisely, is
at stake in his insistence that Frei ought to, indeed must, be thought of—in terms
quite categorical—as committed to, and dependent upon, a Wittgensteinian under-
standing of meaning? What is the basis for insisting, for instance, that “Frei’s critique
of liberal theology, his analysis of theological claims, and his own method are thor-
oughly suffused with, and dependent on, the later Wittgenstein’s views on linguistic
meaning”?17
As I read him, this characterization is crucial to Knight’s strategy for demonstrat-
ing that Frei’s theology is a “dead end.”18 For, if Knight can demonstrate that Frei is
motivated by, and beholden to, ordinary language philosophy, with a highly
13 Frei, “Eberhard Busch’s Biography of Karl Barth,” Types, 158–62.
14 Knight portrays this (wrongly, in my view) as “the central postliberal conviction—that descriptivist
or referential views of linguistic meaning are fundamentally flawed and therefore should not be used in
theology or biblical interpretation. . ..” (Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 224). This claim then becomes the
basis for Knight’s charge of fideism against Frei (and Lindbeck). He continues, “the strength of this con-
viction led Frei and Lindbeck to prohibit reference from playing any role at all in determinations of
meaning. This prohibition, in turn, prevented Frei from distinguishing adequately between semantic and
speech act, and from coherently distinguishing his own theological method from that of D. Z. Phillips. It
has also made both Frei and Lindbeck vulnerable of charges to fideism” (224).
15 Knight, Liberalism vs. Postliberalism, 268–9.
16Where Knight mentions Frei’s Christology, that treatment is subordinated to what Knight character-
izes as Frei’s “fear of Feuerbach” and, further, Frei’s putative embrace of ordinary language philosophy
motivated by his rejection of descriptivist reference (and, thus, the failure of liberal theological method).
Several reviewers have noted these features of Knight’s account. See, for instance, Ben Fulford’s highly
charitable synopsis of Knight’s project. “[W]hile it is plausible to think Wittgenstein informed Frei’s skep-
ticism about general theories, Frei had prior, theological reasons for resisting their application to the gos-
pels, which he articulated consistently throughout his career. Wittgenstein likewise provided warrant for
close attention to Christian practices and how meaning and understanding function there, but did not
supply Frei with their content.” Fulford pinpoints a few further key insufficiencies in Knight’s characteri-
zation of Frei. See Fulford’s Review in Journal of Theological Studies 65, no. 1 (2014): 363–367 (here 366).
17 Knight, “Wittgenstein’s Web,” 359.
18 See Knight, Liberalism vs. Postliberalism, chaps 9–10.
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particular reading of Wittgenstein as its basis, then Frei’s theological project will be
subject to the same devastating criticisms to which that reading of Wittgenstein falls
prey.
Frei Against Himself?
Frei began appropriating insights from Wittgenstein’s writings early in his career,
but always did so in highly qualified ways. He pointed out, for instance, that
Wittgenstein’s directive not to “look for the meaning” but rather to “look for the
use” has often, as Frei put it, “wrongly been given the status of a general principle.”
And while traces of Wittgenstein’s influence upon Frei are evident across his work,
the character and impact of Frei’s engagements with Wittgenstein are subtle and
require delicate elucidation. Hence, Knight’s unqualified characterization of Frei’s
theology as being “suffused with” and “dependent upon” Wittgenstein’s later views
of linguistic meaning risks obscuring the nuance and subtleties of Frei’s engagement
with Wittgenstein’s later work.
For instance, Knight ascribes to Frei what appears to be a “meaning is use” general
interpretive understanding.19 Frei’s view of the literal sense, Knight claims, “reveals his
commitment to a Wittgensteinian understanding of meaning. This. . .understanding of the
literal sense gives to the community the role of the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of any
and all biblical texts. That meaning is now indexed to the use of the text in the living out
of the community’s mission.”20 With this turn, Knight has made two key moves that
inflect his entire treatment of Frei. First, he has identified Wittgenstein with a general
understanding of meaning in which meaning reduces to agreement in communal use.
Second, he has asserted that this is the general understanding by which Frei identifies the
conception of the literal sense that he has embraced by 1982 in his “later work.” On
Knight’s account of Frei, the community uses the biblical text in accord with what it takes
to be its mission, thereby conferring meaning upon the text. As such, that community is
the “ultimate arbiter” of the meaning of any and all biblical texts.
Frei claimed quite clearly that turning Wittgenstein’s adage “look for the use” into
a general interpretive principle (e.g. that “meaning is use”) is, as Frei put it,
“wrong.” Of course, it is not unheard of for a thinker to disavow a claim or position
explicitly, and then go on to enact some version of it despite her own intentions.
Knight does not just cite Frei’s passing reference to Wittgenstein; he offers a reading
of Frei that purports to further substantiate his characterization. Is Knight’s reading a
good one?
In my view, two points get Knight’s case against Frei moving in the wrong direc-
tion. First, it incorrectly ascribes to Frei what I have called “meaning-is-use reduc-
tionism,” i.e. that the meaning of word or claim—or, in Frei’s case, a scriptural
text—is conferred upon it by virtue of (i.e. reduces to) the use upon which some
community of users agrees—as Knight terms it, “the agreed use” of some commu-
nity.21 This first problem results from overlooking (however inadvertently) Frei’s
important distinction between the terms “literal” and “plain.” Frei deploys this dis-
tinction in his discussion of how the literal sense became, was, and ought to be (so
Frei argued), the plain sense in the Christian tradition. As I demonstrate in Part III
19 See, e.g., Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 269 n. 3.
20 Ibid., 209.
21 Ibid., p. 211.
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below, this error has a sub-part in that it is predicated on a misreading of the pas-
sages from Frei’s essay “Interpretation and Narrative.” This is the basis for Knight’s
claim that Frei most fully embraces a “commitment to a Wittgensteinian understand-
ing of meaning.” I propose that this first difficulty with Knight’s case can be cor-
rected by attending more precisely to the orientational role that Frei’s Christology
plays in his writings on the literal sense. As I will argue, the attribution of anything
like “meaning-is-use” reductionism is unfair to Frei. But to deem this reductionism
“Wittgensteinian” is to misread Wittgenstein as well.
The second, but related, difficulty facing Knight’s account results from what seems
to be an over-emphasis of readings of the later Wittgenstein set forth by Scott
Soames and Saul Kripke. Specifically, the account of Wittgenstein that Knight attrib-
utes to Frei is derived from Saul Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein in Wittgenstein on
Rules and Private Language. Perhaps even more influential upon Knight’s account of
Wittgenstein is Scott Soames’ criticisms of a Wittgenstein that looks very much like
Kripke’s Wittgenstein.22 In short, the Wittgensteinianism with which Knight frames
Frei’s work is a thoroughly Soamesian Wittgensteinianism. I take this second set of
problems first. In Part II of this article, I demonstrate how relying upon Kripke
and Soames generates difficulties for Knight’s analysis of Frei.
I will not defend Frei’s theological approach on Wittgensteinian grounds. My pur-
pose is to explicate the relevant philosophical debates over Wittgenstein in order to
identify the source of the difficulties encountered by Knight’s critical strategy. In
short, I find Knight’s portrayal of Wittgenstein to be problematic on its own terms.
And of course, Knight’s portrayal of Wittgenstein is crucial to his analysis of Frei.
His aim is to demonstrate (following Kripke’s construction, and then Soames’
criticisms) that this putatively Wittgensteinian account of meaning is flawed at its
core. Knight then portrays Frei’s account of the literal sense as intrinsically
Wittgensteinian (“about as close to Wittgenstein as a theologian can be”23) in these
peculiarly Wittgensteinian terms. On that basis, Knight then concludes that Frei’s
theological account suffers from the same self-defeating defects as purported of
Wittgenstein’s.
In Part II below I demonstrate that what Knight presents as the “dominant” and
“best” reading of Wittgenstein, and the one his critique of Frei presumes, is not an
accurate reading of Wittgenstein. It is, rather, a brilliant, but highly idiosyncratic,
departure from what Wittgenstein wrote. Neither Frei’s unpublished transcripts and
archival papers, nor the content of his published engagements with Wittgenstein,
give any indication that he deployed that reading. Relying upon this account gener-
ates a difficulty in Knight’s treatment of Wittgenstein. By implication (given the strat-
egy of Knight’s book) it generates a difficulty for his attack upon Frei’s putative
Wittgensteinianism. Second, it may be the case that Knight’s portrayal of Frei ends
up looking ever-so-slightly tailored to fit Knight’s account of Wittgenstein’s views. I
address these difficulties by sifting the details of Frei’s claims about the nature and
basis of the literal sense. My purpose there is to demonstrate the difference it makes
to orient these claims by Frei’s efforts to foreground a high Christology throughout
his career.
22 Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
23 Knight, “Wittgenstein’s Web,” 339.
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There are broader issues at stake here than simply debates among Frei scholars
over his use of Wittgenstein’s later work, and its continuing usefulness for theologi-
cal purposes. For Knight’s broader research program is implicated as well. He aims
to aid theology, and the study of religion at large, by disseminating Scott Soames’
work, and deploying Soames’ criticisms, throughout the relevant fields of theology
and religious studies.
In an earlier article entitled “Why Not Davidson“ Knight identifies one of his over-
arching purposes as introducing Soames’ history of twentieth-century analytic philos-
ophy to students and scholars in the study of religion and philosophy of religion.24
There, Knight deploys Soames’ critical claim that Donald Davidson’s account of lin-
guistic meaning (and by implication, his argument against alternative conceptual
schemes) is fatally flawed and ought to be rejected. This conclusion applies especially
to the relative impact of Davidson’s arguments upon scholars of religion. There is
some consolation to be found even in this failure, however. For Knight endorses
Soames’ compliment of Davidson’s work that, despite its failure, in the scheme of
twentieth-century philosophy it at least “represented a major advance over the
antitheoretical bias of Wittgenstein, Ryle, and others.”25 This putative “antitheoretical
bias” is analogous to the “prohibition on systematizing” that Knight attributes to
Karl Barth.26 Here, Knight risks conflating two distinct phenomena: on the one hand,
Barth’s theologically motivated demurral from predicating his theological work upon
an antecedent philosophical system or comprehensive theory (or even constructing a
finalized theological system); on the other, a purported antipathy toward all uses of
theory and forms of theorizing (i.e. “anti-theoretical bias”). The former accurately
characterizes Barth’s approach, while the latter teeters into caricature. Soames
inveighs against the same putative antitheoretical bias that Knight attributes to Frei,
Lindbeck, and postliberal theologians generally, for purportedly adopting as their
starting points Wittgenstein’s ordinary language philosophy (and specifically, his
rejection of descriptivism).27 By Knight’s lights, Soames has demonstrated why and
how Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and reference fail. Demonstrating this failure
is a crucial step in correcting what Knight diagnoses as the “bias” (especially regard-
ing “anti-theoretical” accounts of meaning and truth) that has allegedly sedimented
across the relevant fields largely through the unfortunate influences of Wittgenstein’s
later work.28
Clearly, Knight takes some risk in following Soames in lockstep as he does.29 For
if it turns out that the problems in postliberal theology over meaning and truth that
Soames (and Knight) diagnose as emerging from Wittgenstein are not, in fact, based
24 John Allan Knight, “Why Not Davidson: Neo-pragmatism in Religion and the Coherence of
Alternative Conceptual Schemes,” Journal of Religion 88, no. 2 (April 2008): 159–89. In contextualizing
Knight’s analysis of Frei within his broader interests and purposes stated in this earlier essay, I do not
mean to suggest that I think his attack on Davidson succeeds.
25 Ibid., 187–88 n. 77; for replication of these charges, see Knight’s Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 146.
26 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 12.
27 Ibid., 227–28.
28 See Knight, “Why Not Davidson,” 160 n.2; 187–88 n. 77.
29 Knight deploys Soames’ arguments from Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century throughout
“Why Not Davidson” 160; 171 n. 45; 173 n. 48; 178 n. 57; 181 n. 67; 185 n. 74; 186 n. 75–76; 187–88 n. 77;
Liberalism Vs. Postliberalism, 41 n. 6; 140 n. 2; 142 n. 4; 144–46; 230 n. 4; 234 n. 13; 245 n. 45; and
“Wittgenstein’s Web,” 339 n. 12; 340 n. 14–16.
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on accurate accounts of Wittgenstein, then Knight’s repudiation of Wittgenstein—
and his repudiation of thinkers who hold to such putatively erroneous
Wittgensteinian views (e.g. Frei)—will also encounter difficulties. In the remainder of
this essay, I argue that Knight’s attack on Frei encounters difficulties for these rea-
sons. I then propose to amend Knight’s account by reexamining Frei’s uses of
Wittgenstein by contextualizing them within Frei’s broader Christological concerns.
Doing so, I suggest, makes evident his use of ad hoc apologetics. The implications
are broad enough to warrant precise grasp of the character of the philosophical
claims which appear to create difficulties in Knight’s account of Frei.30 Thus, I first
explicate Kripke’s portrayal of Wittgenstein, attending to precisely why it is so pro-
foundly controversial as a reading of Wittgenstein. I then examine how these contro-
versies are reflected in Soames’ repudiation of Wittgenstein. I then examine how
these both inflect Knight’s argument against Frei.
II. Kripkenstein’s Web
Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language generated three distinct, but
interrelated, philosophical controversies: 1) a “skeptical paradox” Kripke derives
from Wittgenstein’s treatment of “following a rule,” 2) a “community view” account
of meaning Kripke derives from Wittgenstein’s putative “skeptical solution” to this
“skeptical paradox”; and finally, 3) Kripke’s account of the so-called private language
argument in the Philosophical Investigations (PI). In this section, I briefly describe each
in turn. In the following section I explore possible ways of navigating each contro-
versy drawn from Wittgenstein’s writings. Then I examine the relevance of each
response for accurately understanding Frei’s actual engagement with Wittgenstein.
Kripke identified what he called the “skeptical paradox” in Wittgenstein’s account
of following a rule (PI, para. 201). In this passage Wittgenstein imagines himself con-
fronted by a skeptic. “This was our paradox,” Wittgenstein writes:
[N]o course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of
action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict
with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict there.31
Kripke took Wittgenstein in this passage to embrace the validity of the “skeptical
paradox,” and proposes, in response, a “skeptical solution.”32
30 Indeed, many theologians may be unfamiliar with Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein, as (arguably)
it has received considerably less attention in theological circles compared to the degree it has been
engaged in philosophical circles. In one of the more widely cited accounts of Wittgenstein’s work for
theological purposes, Fergus Kerr sets forth a meticulously exegetical account of Wittgenstein’s writings
with an eye toward their relevance for Christian theology. In this Kerr consigns Kripke’s Wittgenstein
(and the controversies that swirl around it) to a footnote, gesturing toward the repudiation of this puta-
tive reading of Wittgenstein by Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning. See Fergus Kerr, Theology After
Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 110.
31 “This was our paradox” refers to Para 198: “But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this
point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule. That is not what we ought to
say, but rather: every interpretation, together with what is being interpreted, hangs in the air; the former
cannot give the latter any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning” (PI §198).
32 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1982), 8.
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The “skeptical paradox” emerged from the reading of the preceding paragraphs of
the PI (to which Kripke understands para. 201 to be the conclusion). On Kripke’s
reading, to follow a rule entails properly interpreting the meaning of that rule. Of
course, any such interpretation will itself have to be guided by an interpretation of a
prior rule that directs the interpretation of the rule in question. But proper interpreta-
tion of that prior rule also depends upon proper guidance by an antecedent rule that
must itself have been properly interpreted, and will also require an interpreted direc-
tive, so the regress continues ad infinitum. There is no fact—and one thus has no
guarantee—that what I interpret the meaning of, for instance, the ‘1’ sign in a math-
ematical calculation to be at a given point in time is (will be/was) the same meaning
that it had in any previous instance (or will have in any future instance).33 As
Kripke puts the point, “it seems that no matter what is in my mind at a given time, I
am free in the future to interpret it in different ways.”34 The result is interpretive
indeterminacy. In Wittgenstein’s words, if “everything can be made out to accord
with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be
neither accord nor conflict there” (PI 201, para. 1). Here, Wittgenstein allegedly dem-
onstrates that “going on in the same way” in what words mean is an appearance
that floats only on the surface of community relations, but for which there are no
grounding facts or determining directives. Indeed, Kripke writes, “Wittgenstein’s
main problem is that it appears that he has shown all language, all concept forma-
tion, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible.”35
Of course, as Kripke has it, Wittgenstein refuses to let this skeptical paradox win
the day. Thus, Kripke claims, Wittgenstein answers the “skeptical paradox” with a
“skeptical solution”—namely, the claim that ordinary language does not need ulti-
mate justification (e.g. of the kind that Wittgenstein had attempted in the Tractatus).
For even though the skeptic about rule following cannot be answered on his own
terms, nonetheless, the fact remains that ordinary language use somehow holds
together and is mostly successful for communication. The meanings of the words
that are shared by a community of speakers are more or less settled and reliable.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein points to community members’ agreements upon their uses of
ordinary language as all they need to sidestep the skeptic’s paradox about rule fol-
lowing. To answer the “skeptical paradox” about rule following, one need only
appeal to a community’s agreed upon uses of its words (i.e. a word’s agreed role
within a community’s form of life).
With this “skeptical solution” Kripke portrays Wittgenstein as forwarding a
“community view” account of meaning that need do no more than describe the
agreed upon roles that a community’s words play in its form of life. On this account,
it is possible to follow a rule that everyone—or most everyone—else agrees with,
though not possible to provide grounds for following that (or any) rule. In other
words, the possibility of following a rule now requires only an individual commu-
nity member’s adapting to and speaking in accord with the “assertability conditions”
of his or her community. Why strive for self-certifying facts of meaning when an
understanding of meaning as the agreed upon use of a word in the context of a com-
munity’s ordinary language will be perfectly sufficient? Or, as Knight helpfully
33 Ibid., 272–3.
34 Ibid., 294.
35 Ibid., 62.
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restates this position: “In that case, all that is required for a sentence to have mean-
ing is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which it is legitimately
assertable [i.e. that its assertability is warranted, or in effect, warranted assertability
regarding meaning], and that the game that involves its assertion plays a role in our
lives.”36
Notice that on this “community view” account, meaning is a species of agreed
upon social (communal) use. How can I be said to know that the symbol ‘1’ in a
mathematical equation means that I am to add together the two numbers that it
stands between? Kripke’s answer is that the community in question agrees that ‘1’
means addition: “Smith will judge Jones to mean addition by ‘plus’ only if he judges
that Jones’s answers agree with those he intended to give.”37 And further, “if the
individual no longer conforms to what the community would do in these circum-
stances, the community can no longer attribute the concept to him.”38 What follows
from the assertability conditions of communally agreed upon use is not “that the
answer everyone gives to an addition problem is, by definition, the correct one, but
rather that platitude that, if everyone agrees upon a certain answer, then no one will
feel justified in calling the answer wrong.”39 In short, in this community the symbol
‘1’ is correlated with the collective inclination to respond to it by ‘adding’ the num-
bers that stand on either side.
Moreover, if (as a good Wittgensteinian therapeute) I am pressed by the skeptic
for justification as to how I know with certainty what ‘1’ means, at some point my
justifications give out, and I say “Back off, dude. . ..this is just what we do!” At that
point I can give no reasons. In fact, ultimately (and perhaps in most cases) I follow
the rule “blindly.” I just do what I have come to be inclined to do as a participant in
the community in question, and can give no justification. So Kripke:
The entire point of the skeptical argument is that ultimately we reach a level
where we act without any reason in terms of which we can justify our action.
We act unhesitatingly but blindly. This then is an important case of what
Wittgenstein calls speaking without ‘justification’ (‘Rechtfertigung’), but not
‘wrongfully’ (zu Unrecht’). It is part of our language game of speaking of rules
that a speaker may, without ultimately giving any justification, follow his own
confident inclination that this way (say, responding ‘125’ [when asked for the
sum of 68 and 57]) is the right way to respond, rather than another way (e.g.
responding ‘5’) [which would be right on an another function (“quus”) one
which Kripke shows cannot be ruled out as the one being acted on]. That is, the
36Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 147 (italics added). Knight takes me to task for guarding
against the ascription of a kind of “warranted assertability” about meaning to Frei’s uses of Wittgenstein.
I use this term to describe what I elsewhere refer to as “meaning is use” reductionism. On this position,
the meaning of one’s word or sentence is indexed to “whatever your peers will let you get away with”
(i.e. what they will agree, or recognize in practice, the meaning of those words and sentences to be).
Knight takes this as a misplaced literal invocation of John Dewey or Richard Rorty’s understanding of
“truth as warranted assertability” (it is not). Otherwise he cannot think of whose position it might apply
to, and thus characterizes my use of that phrase as metaphorical. While I did not have his understanding
of Wittgenstein in view at the time, I consider my account of that position to apply to his Kripkean con-
strual of Wittgenstein with what Knight calls “legitimate assertability” at its heart.
37 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 91.
38 Ibid., 95
39 Ibid., 112.
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‘assertability conditions’ that license an individual to say that, on a given occa-
sion, he ought to follow this rule this way rather than that, are, ultimately, that
he does what he is inclined to do.40
One responds to the question of truth by appealing to justification conditions. If
pressed, one simply replies, “this is what I am inclined to do,” and this on the basis
of “this is what we do.” In effect saying, “I have come to be inclined to do what the
community is inclined to do.”41 Thus, the community consensus account of meaning
that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein’s “skeptical solution” always and necessarily
stands at a remove from what could be asserted as truly the case. It is always, rather,
what “we agree to be the case.” On this view, meaning and truth are reducible to
what the community of asserters agrees is warranted as assertable (in Knight’s pre-
ferred inflection of this phrase, “legitimately assertable“42) within the community, i.e.
the “brute,” non-normative givenness of its form of life.43
Finally, Kripke takes as a corollary of Wittgenstein’s putative “skeptical solution”
to the “skeptical paradox” that there can be no such thing as a “private language.”44
As we have just seen, the “skeptical solution” was predicated upon the individual’s
accord with the community’s explicit agreement. As such, the “skeptical solution” is
“inapplicable to a single person considered in isolation.”45 For, in order for the
words of such a language to have meaning, they must conform to the uses that the
members of the linguistic community in question agree upon. On this understanding,
any attempt to devise a language singly, as an individual in isolation from a commu-
nity of fellow-users, would be impossible. On Kripke’s “community view” reading
of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, a language speaker cannot speak a lan-
guage in isolation. This is because the words of the language have their meaning
conferred upon them by agreement upon that meaning by the community of users.
Speaking a language at all requires speaking it in accord with a community of
speakers.
Why Not Kripke?
Kripke initially delivered his lectures in 1976, and published them under the title of
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language in 1981. A cascade of rejoinders—from crit-
ics and defenders alike—pointed out that Kripke’s account of Wittgenstein on
“following a rule” was rather abstracted from anything Wittgenstein actually wrote
in the PI.46 In fact, part of what made it a richly generative philosophical text in the
40 Ibid., 87–8.
41 This formulation overlays PI para. 217 over Kripke’s construal of Wittgenstein: “If I have exhausted
the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is sim-
ply what I do’.” In his lengthy repudiation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell points out that
Kripke’s reading, in effect, rewrites para 217 to read: “If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am licensed to say: ‘This is simply what I am inclined to do.’”
Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990),
69–70.
42 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 147.
43 Ibid., 148, 207.
44 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 62.
45 Ibid., 79.
46 To name a few examples among many: Peter Winch, “Critical Study of Kripke (1982)”; G. E. M.
Anscombe, “Critical Notice of Kripke (1982)”; Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell,
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1980s was that Kripke was entirely forthcoming that his treatment of Wittgenstein
neither reflected, nor really even attempted, an accurate engagement with the text of
Wittgenstein’s PI. “My method is to present the argument as it struck me, as it pre-
sented a problem for me,” he explained in response to such concerns in a preface to
the 1982 edition of the text.47 “Probably many of my formulations and recastings of
the argument are done in a way Wittgenstein would not himself approve. So the
present paper should be thought of as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument
nor ‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a
problem for him.”48 And indeed, Kripke’s reading is so idiosyncratic and at odds
with the actual text of the PI that it has come to be broadly referred to in the sur-
rounding literature as KW (“Kripke’s Wittgenstein”) and, perhaps more felicitously,
as “Kripkenstein.”49 Where, precisely, does it part company from the PI?
Perhaps the most significant point at which Kripke leaves off from the text of the
PI occurs where Kripke offers an account of the “skeptical paradox” about rule fol-
lowing. The skeptical paradox Kripke derived from the first part of PI 201 was not
(pace Kripke) a position that Wittgenstein validated. Nor does Wittgenstein even
treat it as a problem needing to be answered. In fact, in the second part of paragraph
201 Wittgenstein claims just the opposite of what Kripke attributed to him. Thus,
reading the two parts of paragraph 201 together fundamentally challenges Kripke’s
portrayal of Wittgenstein.
[Part 1: the portion that Kripke acknowledges] This was our paradox: no course
of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be
made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made
out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And
so there would be neither accord nor conflict there.
[Part 2: the portion that Kripke does not acknowledge] It can be seen that there
is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument
we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a
moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is
that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual
cases.”50
The problem that Kripke identified as vexing Wittgenstein was actually one
Wittgenstein attributed to his imagined interlocutor and then dismissed as an
1984); G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Skepticism, Rules and Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984);
John McDowell, “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,” Synthese 58 (1984): 325–63; David Pears, The False
Prison, Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), Chapters 16–17; Stanley Cavell, Conditions
Handsome and Unhandsome, Chap. 2.
47 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 1982, viii.
48 Ibid., 5.
49 “Kripke’s book was the starting-point for a debate about ‘Kripkenstein’ on rule-following, a debate
which is now conducted largely in blissful disregard for Wittgenstein’s own writings (see Miller and
Wright 2002 [Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright, eds., Rule Following and Meaning (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002]).” Hans-Johann Glock, “Wittgenstein’s Later
Philosophy,” in Michael Beaney, ed., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 587.
50Wittgenstein, PI, Para 201.
A Wittgenstein for Postliberal Theologians 13
VC 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
obvious misunderstanding (“It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding
here. . .”51). Yet by taking seriously the “skeptical paradox,” and then constructing
the “skeptical solution” to it, Kripke first begins to stitch together his
Kripkenstein.
Similarly, the “community view” of meaning that Kripke poses as the solution to
the skeptical problem is not Wittgenstein’s view at all. By contrast, Wittgenstein says
frequently that the kind of agreement that is necessary for “following a rule” is not
explicit agreement between the members of a community. It is not agreement “in
opinions” or beliefs about what it is to follow a rule, or even in what the majority of
members of the community think or take to be the case. To such a notion,
Wittgenstein responds:
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is
false?”—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the
language that they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life (PI,
para. 241).
Agreement in “the language that they use” Wittgenstein clarifies, is agreement at
the level of practices of language use. Agreement in form of life is even more
basic (more on this below). Social practices (such as language use) are instituted
socially. They thus provide the practical context within which any particular
application of a rule (whether the meaning of a word or claim, or whether it is
true or false) is correct or incorrect. This is the sense in which the meaning and
truth of semantic claims (semantics) depends upon and indeed presuppose prag-
matics. In the case in question, this means that linguistic claims and particular
uses of language are possible, and presuppose practices of language use. It is the
normative proprieties of these practices (and not simply “regularities” of use
exhibited by and agreed to by the community) that enable claims about truth and
meaning, but also constrain and hold accountable specific uses of those claims, as
well as the content of those claims.
Rules do not apply themselves. They are able to determine correctness as that
which a practitioner ought to follow (and, indeed, are rules at all) only in the context
of practices of rule following. Thus, as Wittgenstein says:
And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule
is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule “privately”: otherwise
thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PI, 202).
According to the “reductive social regularity account” (a more specific term for
Kripkenstein’s “community view” or “community regularity view”), to follow a
rule correctly means following in accord with what the community (or a majority
of its members) explicitly agrees to. By contrast, in the context of instituted prac-
tices of rule following there is, so Wittgenstein claims in the second half of PI
51Wittgenstein’s repudiation of interpretation in itself appears a few paragraphs prior, in Para 198,
where Wittgenstein writes, “[A]ny interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and
cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning.”
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201, a way of “grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhib-
ited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases.”
What Wittgenstein actually articulates as a response to his imagined interlocutor
in PI 202 and elsewhere differs markedly from Kripkenstein’s claim that the regu-
larity to which a community explicitly agrees is what determines the meaning of
a claim or word. It also challenges Kripke’s claim that the reactions of the com-
munity members provide the criterion by which a word or claim is determined
to have meaning (or be meaningless) and be correct (or incorrect). For the back-
ground practices of rule following entail that whatever the majority of some com-
munity says a term or assertion means, they may be wrong. Once instituted, the
normative role of a word in a language (while subject to inflections depending
upon how it is used in particular instances, by whom, and contextual specifics
such as a speaker’s collateral commitments) acquires an objective status that is
nonetheless relatively established. The practice does not causally determine mean-
ing in successive uses of the word (as if the norms of the practice were “rails
laid out to infinity” that Wittgenstein abjures in PI 218). But the normative insti-
tution of linguistic practices means that the meaning of a word is not indetermi-
nate either. We might describe it as “under-determined” in the sense that it is
flexible vis-a-vis particular uses in specific contexts and circumstances. Novel
applications are enabled through the flexibility of the norms that constitute the
practice. But further applications are constrained by those norms as well. Thus,
the meaning of a word or phrase is not indeterminate. The instituted character of
background social practices means that they are constituted by normative propri-
eties and extend over time. This enables the proprieties of those practices to stand
in judgment over successive particular performances of the practice. It is in this
instituted character of the practice that one of the dimensions of objectivity
emerges and inheres. Wittgenstein describes the institutional character of the prac-
tice as follows:
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which some-
one obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occa-
sion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.—To
obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are cus-
toms (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a lan-
guage. To understand a language means to be master of a technique (PI, para.
199).
Thus, the social practice provides the normative, practical context within which
instances of following a rule (or claims by an individual or group about the cor-
rect or incorrect way to follow a rule) are correct or incorrect. In other words, I
may well think that I am obeying a rule correctly in my use of the word “tree”
in the statement “that is a tree,” and yet be wrong about it. At the same time,
pace Kripke, a group or community may think that they are following a rule,
but, in fact, be wrong about that vis-a-vis the institution of the practice of rule
following in which following that rule is instituted. The explicit use upon which
a group or community may agree is not necessarily the correct use (that explicit
agreement is not the source of the word’s meaning). Communal agreement is
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accountable to the norms of the practice in which they participate, as well as
how things are with those things about which the practice is directed.52
To this point, Knight objects that the objectivity that a social practice generates still
presupposes, and is relative to, the community in which it is instituted.53 Social prac-
tices may be normatively and materially constituted in ways to which any and all
practitioners are accountable. However, his objection runs, as products of human
social activity, these practices are still “ultimately conventional.” Thus, norms, rules,
and objectivity are always relative to what a particular community has instituted.
Wittgenstein draws a distinction between explicit consensus (e.g. Kripkenstein’s regu-
larity of community agreement) and the “consensus” or congruity in social practices
that make explicit agreement possible in the first place. Both these instituted practices,
and the normative proprieties constitutive of them (sometimes explicated as rules) have
an objective status. They “stand in judgment over” (i.e. normatively constrain, even as
they enable) any particular performance or enactment of a practice. They even stand in
judgment over the communal consensus about it, and thus, however far back one
pushes the notion of objectivity, normativity is generated by social practices. This is still
“conventional,” but in the sense that human claims (in all their objectivity) always and
already presuppose and depend upon human social practices. For anywhere there are
human claims, there are human social practices of concept and language use.54
When it comes to explaining the meaning of words, Wittgenstein says, for
instance:
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word
“meaning” it can be explained thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the
language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its
bearer (PI, para. 43).
Notice here that “meaning” is not indexed to the use agreed upon by the community
(or what a majority of its members agree to) as a criterion of correctness. In many
52Of course social practices change over time, and no two repeated performances of the practices are exactly
identical. But the diachronic dimension of practices also constitutes a vector of practical accountability for practi-
tioners, and what I might call “non-identical repetition” of performances of the practice. Wittgenstein addresses
the extension of the normative proprieties of the practice over time, suggesting that any particular instance is
accountable to the trajectory of antecedent (and ostensively future) performances of the practice that have
adequately met its normative proprieties. “‘But I don’t mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines
the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense pres-
ent.’—But of course it is, ‘in some sense’! Really the only thing wrong with what you say is in the expression ‘in a
queer way’. The rest is all right; and the sentence only seems queer when one imagines a different language-
game for it from the one in which we actually use it” (PI, 195). As Hilary Putnam points out, this is another piv-
otal passage that Kripke misreads, again mistaking the interlocutor’s claim for one that Wittgenstein himself
embraces (i.e. including the phrase “in a queer way”). Putnam takes Kripke to task for his reading of
Wittgenstein in Hilary Putnam, “Kripkean Realism and Wittgenstein’s Realism,” in Anat Biletzki, ed., The Story
of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2002), 241–52.
53 Knight, “Wittgenstein’s Web,” 357–58.
54 Surely, we can hypothesize about what the objective states of affairs in the world would have been
like if humans (and thus human social practices and conventions) had never existed or evolved.
However, our doing this is always and already on the basis of our conceptual and linguistic social prac-
tices and conventions. But this only pinpoints the objectivity of human social practices, thus introducing
another cross-contextual feature of accountability and comparability. So, the very conceptualization of the
non-linguistic natural kinds of the world over against human normative conceptual netting cast over it is
already to have misread Wittgenstein.
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cases (though, again, not all of them) particular uses of a word are accountable to
that word’s role in the language, which, of course, is both enabled and constrained
by the practices of language use. And thus, someone deciding to rename a baseball
an “engine block” is accountable to more than a particular cohort of self-baptized
“engineblock players” (on Knight’s example, a group of people he might assemble
who agree with him to call the game baseball “engineblock”55) if they are to pass
that community’s examination for employing the correct meaning of that word. On
Wittgenstein’s account, in fact, the claims of that “community” are accountable to
the normative proprieties of the up and running practice of language-use from which
its languages emerge. And so the instituted social practices enable speakers to
address Knight and his merry band of would-be “engine block” players and perhaps
chuckle at the peculiarity of philosophers, but eventually to say—”that is a baseball”
—and of course, be correct about that. How would they know that? Perhaps they
would point to the baseball and say “but look, it is a baseball.” If pressed as to how
they could know that, they might reply, “I have learnt to speak English.”56
It is possible that in some different culture, a game had evolved that turned out to
be identical to baseball, but had entirely different words for its name and each of its
features. That game would still be subject to the objective constraints of linguistic
social practices and the objective features of the respective games. Any linguistic dif-
ferences would be adjudicated between the two cultures on the basis of translation.
The “conventional” divergence in the names and words used is possible only against
a background of more extensive agreement, including the physical, material, and
extensional features of a shared world. It is of “greatest importance,” Wittgenstein
quips, “that a conflict hardly ever arises between persons about whether the color of
this object is the same as the color of that; the length of this rod the same as the
length of that, etc.”57 Elsewhere he makes the point more expansively. “The common
behavior of mankind [sic] is the system of reference by means of which we interpret
an unknown language” (PI, para. 206).58
55 Knight, “Wittgenstein’s Web,” 353.
56 “How do I know that this color is red? –It would be an answer to say: ‘I have learnt English.’” (PI,
381). For a particularly lucid repudiation of the conventionalist implications of Kripke’s Wittgenstein, see
Barry Stroud, “Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community” (1990), in Meaning,
Understanding, and Practice: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 80–94 (esp. 92–3).
57 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M.
Anscombe, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), 323.
58On this point (and how Kripke’s account diverges from it), Robert Brandom helpfully explicates
Wittgenstein. On one hand, certain types of “conventional” practices presuppose features of the world
that shape and constrain those practices (e.g. practices of measurement presuppose “rigidity, spatial
invariance under transportation, and temporal constancy of measuring rods, interpersonal comparability
of measurements, the functional equivalence of various means of measuring the same length, the irrele-
vance of the results of such contextual features as whether the object measured is sacred or profane, to be
used in sport or commerce, and so on”). He continues: “There are three levels at which performances can
be discussed: a level of norms explicit in rules and reasons, a level of norms implicit in practice, and a
level of matter-of-factual regularities, individual and communal. To say that various claims made at the
third level state necessary conditions for the applicability of vocabulary of the sort employed at the first
two is not to make a reductive claim. The social regularity view [e.g. Kripke and Wright] conflates the
second and the third levels, and so misunderstands Wittgenstein’s remarks about the significance of
matter-of-factual regularities, by taking them to involve commitment to the possibility of a reduction of
the normative to the dispositional [e.g. the reductive social regularity account].” Robert Brandom, Making
It Explicit (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 46.
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Thus, whether through translational calibration (e.g. “grun” in German means
green), or within a single language, words and claims are subject to empirical and
extensional assessment. For linguistic practices are bound up with the world. And
again, as they emerge from the institutions and practices of language use, the mean-
ings and roles of words and claims stand in judgment over particular uses of them,
and thus over particular instances of linguistic practices. As Wittgenstein suggests in
the PI, linguistic practices are not a “social-practical” conventionalist web of meaning
cast over—and thus standing between— natural kinds. When words mean and refer,
they do so directly. In referring, words touch directly and immediately with the
things they are bound up with. So Wittgenstein:
When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case we—and our meaning—
do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this-is-so (PI, para. 95).
On this account “meaning” is not a ghostly intermediary that bridges a gap between
social practices and the “things in themselves” that they are about. Language users
are not constantly interpreting the “stuff” of the world as something with each asser-
tion they make. Within the context of social practices, to take an example of
Wittgenstein’s (PI, para. 198), signposts are not “normatively inert” stuff standing
idly by, waiting to have meaning conferred upon them by discrete acts of interpreta-
tion. Within a context in which signpost following is an instituted social practice, the
signpost just is a signpost. As such, it speaks to those acculturated into the practices
of signpost following. Thus, it is direct (immediate, non-inferential). In other words,
the conceptual articulated-ness of a particular signpost grasps those who know how
to follow signposts.
Herein lies the difference between understanding and interpretation. For the for-
mer, the normative proprieties of the practice mean that there are correct and incor-
rect ways to respond to the signpost. For the latter, the idea that to recognize the
signpost as signpost is to always already have applied a rule in interpreting it as a
signpost falls into the erroneous regulist regress in that one needs to have followed a
rule in order to guide one’s interpretation of the signpost, and an interpretation of
a rule prior to that to guide the interpretation of the interpretation, and on ad infini-
tum.59 Hence, as Wittgenstein describes it, to understand meaning is to just grasp
the normative significance of the thing directly—”Try not to think of understanding
as a ‘mental’ process at all.—For that is the expression which confuses you. . .” (PI,
para. 154).60 The institution of conceptual and linguistic practices interweave with
59 For two helpful treatments (both responding to how Kripke’s Wittgenstein goes astray on this
point), see Charles Taylor, “To Follow a Rule,” in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press: 1995), 165–180, and David Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003).
60 “The absent-minded man who at the order ‘Right turn!’ turns left, and then, clutching his forehead,
says ‘Oh! right turn’ and does a right turn. - What has struck him? An interpretation?” (PI, 506). Barry
Stroud helps clarify this point: “We who understand or interpret the words ‘Add 2 each time’ as they are
normally meant in English recognize what rule those words express, but it would be confusion to say
that in addition we also understand or recognize what rule that rule expresses. Once we know what rule
those words express, just as a person knows what proposition a certain clump of trees expresses, ‘there
can be no further question of an understanding’; there is nothing left to be understood. ‘That really is
how it is; when we are thinking, there isn’t any interpretation going on.’ (PG, 144).” Stroud, “Meaning
and Understanding,” The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, 304.
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empirical features of the way things are, and also constrain as incorrect particular
instances of language use (use of a word or claim).
Clearly, the foregoing passages from Wittgenstein’s PI differ markedly from what
Kripke thinks follows from the assertability conditions of communally agreed upon
use—namely, not “that the answer everyone gives to an addition problem is, by defi-
nition, the correct one, but rather that platitude that, if everyone agrees upon a cer-
tain answer, then no one will feel justified in calling the answer wrong.”61 Or, as
Kripke writes further on, “In Wittgenstein’s own model. . .if the community all agrees
on an answer and persists in its views, no one can correct it. . .[I]f the corrector were
outside the community, on Wittgenstein’s view, he has not the ‘right’ to make any
correction.”62 But here Kripke diverges again rather starkly from what Wittgenstein
writes in the PI. For, as Wittgenstein makes clear, the normative proprieties of social
practices provide grounds to correct an instance or performance of a practice—even
one agreed to by all (or a majority) of the community in question.63
By now it should be clear that the Kripkensteinian account of the private language
argument is also highly idiosyncratic.64 Kripke’s claim about the “impossibility of
private language emerges as a corollary of [Wittgenstein’s] sceptical solution of his
own paradox,” not from the text of the PI.65 Because the condition for the possibility
of meaning depends upon community agreement, the possibility of language is, for
Kripke’s Wittgenstein, “inapplicable to a single person considered in isolation.”66
As Wittgenstein investigates this matter, by contrast, the “private language”
deemed impossible does not refer to a potential language user making up his or her
own language in isolation from a community of fellow language-users (pace the
Kripkensteinian portrayal). In the actual text of the PI, Wittgenstein characterizes
“private language” as applicable only to the private, immediate inner sensations of
the inventor of that language. As such, a private language is putatively impossible
for any other language speaker to understand (and, by implication, to translate). It
“describes my inner experiences and which only myself can understand” and is “for
[the inventor’s] private use” (PI, para. 256). Further, as Wittgenstein describes, “the
words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the speaker; to his
61 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 112.
62 Ibid., 143
63 Recall here Wittgenstein’s example of the wood sellers (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,
94). The example portrays the possibility for some community to persist in shunning correction or persua-
sion regarding their inconsistency in the way they use the terms “more of” and “less than” in measuring
amounts of wood. This appears to prompt the outsider to leave them to their own “system” as one possi-
ble result. And yet, far from asserting relativism or incommensurability about the meaning of those terms,
Wittgenstein points to the possibility of some person external to a community understanding the com-
munity’s practices, and then working at length to correct and persuade its members of the inconsistencies
in their uses of these phrases. And Wittgenstein suggests that the outsider may well be successful at that.
In other words, these tasks are by no means impossible for the outsider “by right” (pace Kripke).
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s likening the group’s refusal to be corrected on this point to the “wise men of
Gotham” alludes to the possibility (perhaps the likelihood) of their having collateral reasons for their per-
sistence in their refusal to be corrected that are, ostensibly, understandable and, with reference to their
own circumstances, perhaps even wise.
64As Kripke himself acknowledges, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 113. For a more exten-
sive treatment of the character of Kripke’s divergence from Wittgenstein on this point (and the difficulties
it generates for Kripke’s account), see Warren Goldfarb, “Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules,” The Journal of
Philosophy 82, no. 9 (September 1985): 471–88.
65 Ibid., 68.
66 Ibid., 79.
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immediate, private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language”
(PI, para. 243). By contrast, on the Kripkensteinian reading, these characterizations
do not reflect what Wittgenstein has in mind with the “private language” argument.
For, again, on Kripke’s reading, the notion of a “private language” must be indexed
to “the skeptical problem and its solution.”67
This does not pertain (again, pace Kripkenstein) to the putative impossibility of
meaningful language evolved by a solitary person (i.e. a language constituted apart
from a community of fellow-users of that language). Here one might think of the
speech devised by Robinson Crusoe, had he been stranded as an infant on a desert
island (and thus a solitary language user). Such a solitary language inventor could
very well come to be understood in other languages through processes of transla-
tion.68 Rather, Wittgenstein’s private language argument casts suspicion on the possi-
bility of a language so sealed-off in interior privacy and of its own kind (perhaps, as
such, “incommensurable” with all other languages) as to be intrinsically unintelli-
gible to other language-users. It is, thus, not translatable by any other language
speakers. It is essentially and exhaustively immediate and internal to its inventor.
However, to recognize something as a language at all (however internal, private, and
discrete) already presupposes a shared background of linguistic practices, and thus,
commensurability with other languages. This makes it possible in principle for any-
one who recognizes something as a language to understand and to translate it.
Suppose that a solitary person invents a language that implicates him or her in lin-
guistic practice (i.e. the rule following practices which are fundamental to our lan-
guage game). The rules of that language will not be whatever he/she takes them to
be (or says they are) at any given point. For Wittgenstein, language-use is predicated
upon the practices of rule following. This means that even the solitary inventor of
the language is accountable to the normative constraints that make the language a
language at all. To invent a language is to bind oneself by the norms of the language
that one has invented. This, again, reflects the authority structure one finds in
Wittgenstein: when I bind myself by a rule, the content of the rule by which I bind
myself flies free of any sense I might have or any claim I might make that I have fol-
lowed the rule.69 For otherwise, Wittgenstein points out, “to think that one was fol-
lowing a rule would be following the rule.” But, recall, Wittgenstein firmly rejects
the latter claim, saying the opposite: “One would like to say: whatever is going to
seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’”
(PI, para. 258). Because following a rule is a practice whose norms fly free of what
any practitioner (even the solitary inventor of a language) takes him or herself to
67 Ibid. Again, what Kripke identifies as PI 138–242, and characterizes as “the primary concern” of his
essay.
68 Kripke attempts to anticipate this objection by characterizing any recognition of such a Crusoe fig-
ure as automatically “taking him into our community” and to have always and already removed him
from true isolation, and relocated him into the context of our “assertability conditions” (110). Baker and
Hacker respond by appealing to the distinction between background practices and agreement in
judgments/responses. “To be sure, in order to grasp [Crusoe’s rules] we must understand what counts,
in Crusoe’s practice, as following the rules. And that must be evident in Crusoe’s activities. But that is not
the same as checking to see whether his responses agree with ours, let alone a matter of ‘taking him into
our community’.” See their Skepticism, Rules, and Language,(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 40–41.
69 This is the account of conceptual authority that I use (borrowing from Brandom’s articulation of
it)—the two-ply effectiveness of force and content together. See Jason Springs, Toward a Generous
Orthodoxy, 158–65.
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have done, to think one is obeying a rule is not necessarily to obey it. Likewise, to claim
that whatever one does or thinks in one’s purely “private” realm, at any given moment,
instantiates and follows a rule, is not to follow a rule. And this is the reason it is not possi-
ble to obey a rule “privately” in the senseWittgenstein articulates in the PI.
Thus, to be a language at all is to be intrinsically other than “private” (i.e.
“language which describes my inner experiences and which only myself can under-
stand” (PI, para. 256), and is “for [my] private use”). Rather, it is to be intrinsically
understandable, follow-able, and translatable by other linguistic practitioners. It is a
practice to which any rule follower is accountable (regardless of what he or she
thinks or claims to be the case). In sum, Kripke departs rather drastically from the
actual text of the PI, treating “Wittgensteinian themes” in idiosyncratic ways (as
Kripke acknowledges). It is not an actual reading of what Wittgenstein wrote.
Frei acknowledged first reading Wittgenstein’s PI as early as 1964. Even so, his
explicit engagements with Wittgenstein are relatively spare in the overall scheme of
his corpus. Nor is there any evidence or indication in any of Frei’s writings or papers
that he read Kripke’s treatment of Wittgenstein. Some of Wittgenstein’s actual writ-
ings did provide a resource Frei drew upon for his Christological purposes. On one
hand, Frei’s references to Wittgenstein reflect his use of ad hoc apologetics (described
in Part I above). At the same time, as I demonstrate in Part III below, Frei’s passing
engagements with Wittgenstein are not Kripkensteinian in character. Knight’s treat-
ment of Frei, by contrast, is structurally inflected by the mistaken assumption that
Frei’s commitments are fundamentally Kripkensteinian. Indeed, it seems that the
Kripkensteinian “community regularity view” of meaning serves as a pre-fixed frame
with which Knight tailors his characterization of Frei’s work. I fear this ultimately
leaves Knight without resources to understand the ways that Frei actually appropri-
ated Wittgenstein’s thinking.
Why Not Soames?
Scott Soames’ treatment of Wittgenstein is less well-known than Kripke’s. Here, I
will address only some features of Soames’ account that contribute to Knight’s case
against Frei. As Soames characterizes it, Wittgenstein’s later work formulates a
“conventionalist” account of meaning. This means that words and sentences do not
derive their meaning by virtue of referring to, describing, or relating in any way to
objects in the world; it rejects any account according to which the meaning of a sen-
tence is “the potential fact or state of the world that it represents.”70 Words and sen-
tences derive their meaning purely from the agreement expressed in their use by a
group of speakers in some context. Thus, meaningful language is possible only if
there is what Soames calls “an agreed upon pattern of use of the expression to which
language users conform that allows it to play a useful and intelligible role in their
lives. . ..[A]ny expression for which there are socially useful agreed-upon conditions
of correct application qualifies as meaningful.”71 Thus Soames has characterized
Wittgenstein as offering a reductionist account of “meaning as use.” That is, the
meaning of words reduces to the conformity of its use with the use that the respec-
tive community of users (or a majority of its members) agrees to. Hence, the meaning
of a word or sentence really is a kind of warranted assertability regarding meaning
70 Ibid., xx.
71 Soames, Philosophical Analysis, II, xxi.
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(“legitimate assertability” Knight says)—the meaning that your peers agree to
(explicitly or in the regularities of their behavior). The correctness of any application
of a word is determined by whether or not that application is in “conformity with
community use.”72
Soames’ account replicates at least five of Kripkenstein’s most central characterizations
of Wittgenstein in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Like Kripke, Soames (1)
claims that Wittgenstein’s consideration of rule-following is “the centre of gravity”73 of
the Philosophical Investigations; and (2) ascribes to Wittgenstein the requirement of agreed
to uses among the members of a community as the means by which words can be said to
have a meaning (thus forwarding the “community view” of Wittgenstein for which
Kripkenstein is an exemplar). In other words, as Soames reconstructs Wittgenstein
“conformity with community use provides standards of correctness for an individual’s
use of many of our most basic terms.”74 In order for someone’s use of a term (elementary
or otherwise) to have meaning, that use must meet with the agreement of the other mem-
bers of the community of language users.75
What naturally follows from this is that (3) Soames replicates the Kripkensteinian
“private language argument” as challenging the possibility of a “solitary language
user.” This is because a solitary person would not be subject to the agreed upon uses
of the (majority of) fellow users of the language. Further, (4) Soames ascribes to
Wittgenstein the position that at the level of justification at which reasons give out,
all a member of some community has to rely upon is instinct: one “applies a word
instinctively”—”We do not follow ‘internal rules’ but our inclinations.”76
Like Kripkenstein, Soames elides Wittgenstein’s claims that the nature and charac-
ter of the agreement is at the level of background practices and practical contexts of
linguistic use (the constitutive congruities and material constraints of language-use).
He thus overlooks how these background levels of agreement then make semantic
claims about meaning and truth (whether they agree or disagree) possible, and
language-use generally (which generates the possibility of translation even for a soli-
tary user/inventor of a language). This subjects Soames’ portrayal of Wittgenstein to
the same responses that Kripke inspired. As Michael Beaney puts it, “What is impor-
tant is that there exists a practice of linguistic use in which there could be agreement
in judgments.”
(5) Like Kripke, Soames admits that the account of Wittgenstein he sets forth devi-
ates from anything Wittgenstein says in the PI and results in a portrayal of
Wittgenstein that Wittgenstein himself would surely reject.77 In fact, Soames’
72 Ibid., 34 n 2; see also 17, 25, 32, 34, 38–40, 50, 52.
73 Ibid., 31
74 Ibid., 34, n 2.
75 See, e.g., Ibid., 17, 25, 32, 34, 38–40, 50, 52.
76 Ibid., 33–4.
77 Knight acknowledges Soames’ admission that Wittgenstein would surely reject his characterization
of Wittgenstein’s views. However, Knight then brushes past this concern, saying that Wittgenstein’s rejec-
tion of Soames’ treatment of his work would be rooted in Wittgenstein’s “anti-theoretical sentiment”
(Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 146). This bias would then determine Wittgenstein’s response to Soames’
effort to transmute Wittgenstein’s PI into a theory (or “toward a theory”). Again, here Knight conflates an
unsystematic approach (i.e. Wittgenstein’s effort to avoid asserting and defending philosophical theses) to
philosophical reflection with “antitheoretical bias.” In my view, Wittgenstein would resist Soames’ charac-
terization of his views for the same reasons that many Wittgenstein scholars have as well—namely,
because Soames’s characterizations deviate so greatly from what Wittgenstein actually wrote. In a lucid
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portrayal of “Wittgenstein” replicates what are, arguably, the most distinctive fea-
tures of Kripkenstein. Soames adds to this a claim that Wittgenstein’s “anti-
theoretical bias” is indicative of “ordinary language philosophy” generally. He then
criticizes Wittgenstein’s PI as flawed at its core. That this Kripkensteinian account
becomes the basis for Soames’ repudiation of Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning is
central to Knight’s use of Soames’s account. In what follows, I briefly examine how
the above picture of Kripkenstein orients and colors Knight’s characterization of Frei
and subsequent criticisms.
Why Not Knight?
Kripke’s portrayal of Wittgenstein is, as Kripke himself acknowledges, broadly (if
intentionally) inexact. It is in replicating Kripke’s central claims as if they were accu-
rate that Soames’s allegedly devastating criticisms of Wittgenstein become misdir-
ected. Hence, Knight’s treatment of Frei encounters difficulties not merely at the
theological level (more on this in Part III below). It also encounters difficulties
because the account of Wittgenstein with which Knight characterizes Frei’s theology,
and then on that basis declares it a dead end, is faulty.
Knight acknowledges the general controversies surrounding Kripke’s account. He
proposes to take the “uncontroversial” portion while leaving the controversies
aside.78 But is this feasible? In fact, the three portions of Kripke’s account are inter-
linked. This is Kripke’s claim, at least.79 And Knight indicates that the
Kripkensteinian understanding of the “private language argument” emerges as a cor-
ollary to, and is dependent upon, the skeptical paradox and skeptical solution:
[T]hese specifiable circumstances [in which an assertion could be determined to
be “legitimately assertable”], and the role that the assertion plays, can only be
specified with reference to a community. They don’t make sense as applied to a
single individual considered in isolation. This is because to ask about roles that
an assertion plays and the conditions under which it can play that role is to ask
about what rule we follow in asserting it. But Wittgenstein argues that, consider-
ing a person in isolation, there is no fact about her in virtue of which we can tell
in a given case whether she is following a rule or not. Thus, it is not possible to
obey a rule privately.80
and highly charitable review essay, Michael Kremer points out that, in his treatment of the later
Wittgenstein, “Soames neglects a large scholarly controversy, which has brought into question many
claims around which he builds his story [i.e. the controversy embroiling Kripke’s Wittgenstein].” Kremer
continues, “Curiously, while Soames often supplies copious quotations from the figures he discusses, his
summary of Wittgenstein’s general views on meaning and understanding (Vol. 2, 33–44) is not based on
a single piece of textual evidence.” With remarkable clarity and charity, Kremer goes on to take specific
issue with Soames’ treatment of Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Kripke. Michael Kremer, “Review of
Scott Soames’ (Book 1) Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1: The Dawn of Analysis; (Book
2) Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: The Age of Meaning,” Notre Dame Philosophical
Reviews (September 19, 2005): https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24868-book-1-philosophical-analysis-in-the-
twentieth-century-vol-1-the-dawn-of-analysis-book-2-philosophical-analysis-in-the-twentieth-century-vol-2-
the-age-of-meaning/ (visited Oct. 8, 2015).
78 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 147, n 19.
79 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 68.
80 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 147.
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The position that Knight here ascribes to Wittgenstein actually restates the
Kripkensteinian account of private language and the skeptical paradox. What is
“legitimately assertable” as a meaningful assertion (or is warranted as assertable, i.e.
warranted assertability regarding meaning) is specified by agreement with the
fellow-members of the community.
Now, Knight has acknowledged that he follows Kripke’s account of Wittgenstein.
He acknowledges, further, that Kripke’s “skeptical” interpretation is controversial.
He purports to take only those portions of the account that are not controversial. But
at this point it is not clear precisely what Knight understands Kripke’s controversial
“skeptical interpretation” to be. For Knight takes the account of Wittgenstein he
advances here to be not only comfortably removed from those controversies, but the
“dominant” and “best” understanding of Wittgenstein.81 And yet, though he restates
Kripkenstein’s position with great fidelity, Knight takes himself to be accurately rep-
resenting what “Wittgenstein argues” in the PI.82 However, Wittgenstein argued
none of these things. It is, rather, Kripkenstein who argues that, “as is well known,
Wittgenstein rejects ‘private language’” (i.e. the impossibility of language for “a per-
son in isolation” from an actual community of fellow language-users, and about
whom “there is no fact. . .in virtue of which we can tell in a given case whether she
is following a rule or not”).83 Contrary to what he takes himself to be doing, it
appears that Knight has swallowed the Kripkensteinian account hook, line, and
sinker. And this, we will see below, creates a structural difficulty in his analysis of
Frei.
III. Wittgenstein and Frei on the Role of Reference in Meaning
Knight follows Soames in claiming, “In the Investigations Wittgenstein rejects the
notion that the meaning of a sentence (atomic or otherwise) consists in the possible
fact of the state of affairs that it describes.”84 As Knight puts the point, on this
account “language cannot acquire its meaning from its ability to describe or refer to
some part or aspect of the world. Instead, language gets its meaning from the roles(s)
it plays in an agreed pattern of usage that structures some significant and intelligible
part of our lives.”85 Further, “even the parts that do have referential or descriptive
functions are not completely referential or descriptive.” And yet, referring is one of
the things people do when they use language and engage in actions. Knight (follow-
ing Soames) casts this as an either/or—as though the agreed upon practices of some
community (some form of life) cannot be accountable to the way things are in the
world. Again, what Wittgenstein says is:
When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case we—and our meaning—
do not stop anywhere short of the fact (PI, para. 95).
81 Knight, “Wittgenstein’s Web,”, 339.
82 Ibid.
83 The latter point, which Knight ascribes to Wittgenstein, is derived by Kripke from his “skeptical
interpretation.” See Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 272–3.
84 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 146.
85 Ibid, 142.
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Likewise, Knight makes much of the fact that Wittgenstein comes back to a “form
of life.” He takes this to mean that a form of life is just “brute” for Wittgenstein. This
makes Wittgenstein (and so Frei) subject to Soames’s charge of Kripkensteinian
“conventionalism.” Let us revisit this just for a moment. Knight understands “form
of life” in terms of Kripke’s and Soames’ understanding of agreement at the level of
“following a rule.” He writes:
[T]he rules on which we agree, the way in which they interact with our practices,
constitute our form of life. For Wittgenstein, our form of life is just a given; it is a
brute fact that must be simply accepted, it is in the context of our form of life
that the agreement of the community is enacted.86
Notice the role of rules in this description. The “form of life” is constituted by the
community’s agreement upon certain rules, and the interaction of those rules with
the community’s practices. This configuration is “brute.” But where does
Wittgenstein say that “the rules on which we agree. . .constitute our form of life?”
Knight offers no textual citation. What Wittgenstein says is that “following a rule is
FUNDAMENTAL to our language game,” and that “following a rule is a practice.
And to think that I am following a rule does not mean that I am following a rule.”87
But the community’s agreement upon the rules does not itself constitute a form of
life. Rather, for there to be rules, and for those rules to be binding and to bind action,
practices of rule following must already up and running, in all the material and
empirical constraints they presuppose. The former is contingent upon the latter. And
this point is determinative for how Wittgenstein’s “forms of life” are understood. To
consider what Wittgenstein writes, and contextualize these claims within his later
writings: “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life”
(PI, para. 226). Or, as Wittgenstein puts it in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology,
Vol. I, §630, [very general] “facts of living.” What might it mean to think of “forms
of life” in terms of very general facts of living?88
Wittgenstein indicates that the linguistic practices on which he focuses so much
attention are not unique or categorically distinct from, but rather are bound with, the
basic non-linguistic features of human beings. For instance, linguistic activities such
as commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, among others, “are as much a
part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.” The latter do not
explicitly involve (“do not depend on”) language per se (PI, para. 25). For
Wittgenstein, there is nothing intrinsically impossible about ostensive reference
understood as bound up with our practices of communication and meaning.
86 Ibid., 148.
87 See the helpful exposition of Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 110.
The Wittgenstein quotation is from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees,
G. E. M. Anscombe, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans., revised edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), (VI,
28) and PI, 202. Emphasis in original.
88As Hilary Putnam points out, on occasion, Wittgenstein does say things that may sound like they
support the kind of relativism and non-normativity that Kripke ascribes to the concept of “form of life”
(e.g. PI, Para 559). Putnam demonstrates how such a reading de-contextualizes these sayings. See, for
instance, Hilary Putnam, “Wittgenstein on Reference and Relativism,” in Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 158–79 (esp. 168–79).
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Wittgenstein emphatically denies that ostensive reference is the entry level to
understanding and explaining meaning. “Children do not learn that books exist, that
armchairs exist, etc. etc.—they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc.” (OC
476). Children learn language through the practice of matching words with the items
(or images of the items) to which those words refer, and thus come gradually onto
the scene of language acquisition. Such learning comes only after much accompani-
ment, training and ever-so-gradual participation in the practices of toing and froing
with their surroundings. This occurs through engagement with, and eventual imita-
tion of, those who live and speak with them. It occurs through socialization, and
eventual explicit instruction by caregivers over time. It comes after much sitting in
chairs, crawling on floors, swinging in swings, sleeping in cradles, drinking water,
eating food, cooing, and babbling that provokes responses by caregivers, and so
forth. Playing the “matching game” of word and referent is possible only for those
who already have sufficient practical knowledge (“know how”) of their environs and
incipient grasp of social practices. Such emergent “know how” includes the practical
abilities by which they distinguish between—and so vary their interactions with—
this and that, here and there, and so forth. This incipient “know how” comes far
prior to the “know-that” of matching word to referent.
Once rudimentary concept use and communicative exchange are up and running
as practices, then explaining and clarifying meaning—and holding each other
accountable—through referring ostensively emerges from them. On this view of
acculturation, training, and socialization into linguistic practices, customs, and insti-
tutions, linguistic practice is normative all the way down. Any or all of the partici-
pants are accountable to the normative constraints of the practice. The community is
accountable to the normative and empirical constraints of the practice as well.
On the Kripkensteinian reading, by contrast, the community is just “given” in a
non-normative sense. Individuals are correct by going in accord with— or incorrect
by going against— agreed upon community consensus. Participation in that agree-
ment (by acting in accord with the agreed upon uses of the group) occurs ultimately,
as Soames says, instinctively, or dispositionally. The deepest level of justification for
this agreement is that this is how one has been trained by virtue of one’s participa-
tion in the community (or majority) consensus, and again, that “this is what we do.”
But, on this account, the “brute” and “given” character of the agreement of the com-
munity itself is neither correct nor incorrect about what its communal agreements
determine to be the case— “the community just goes.” As Knight puts it, “the form
of life is just given; it is a brute fact that must simply be accepted, and . . .[in which]
agreement of the community is enacted.”89
89 Ibid. Readers of Robert Brandom will recognize this as exemplifying what he characterizes as an I-
We conception of authority and normativity, and a reading of Wittgenstein that he repudiates as a
“reductive social regularity account of the practices in which norms are implicit” (Brandom, Making It
Explicit, 46). We can also see exemplified here the way that “communal agreement” is portrayed as the
criterion for correctness and how it personifies the community as though it were, itself, an individual
actor. “Thus to pick one page almost at random, Kripke talks about ‘the community’s accepting’ condi-
tionals codifying relations between attributions of intentional states and commitments to act, what ‘the
community regards as right,’ what ‘the community endorses,’ and so on” (Brandom, Making It Explicit,
38). In my view, Knight imputes precisely such a Kripkensteinian account of communal authority to Frei.
As Knight alleges, for Frei, “Christians have a distinctive form of life, and the meanings of their religious
language, of theological language, and of the biblical texts, all derive from the role such language plays
in their form of life.” Moreover, the meaning of that language comes “only from the use—the agreed
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It is this understanding of Wittgenstein that Knight attributes to Frei, which he
then critiques, and concludes that Frei’s project is a dead end. Knight insists that, for
Wittgenstein, a form of life is just “brute.” Knight then alleges that Frei’s construal of
the church as a language-forming form of life has precisely this Kripkensteinian
sense. The Christian community is just “brute.” As such, it is the “ultimate arbiter”
over the meaning of every scriptural text. Thus, the form of life (here, what it takes
its mission to be) is the context in which the members of the community converge
upon their agreed upon uses as the source of meaning. Individual members can be
out of step with that. But the community itself can be neither correct nor incorrect.
The community “just goes” in the sense that whatever the Christian community
decides is the literal sense of the scriptural text will be literal sense of the scriptural
text. As Knight puts the point, “Thus what makes a particular sense of a biblical text
the ‘literal’ sense is whatever the community’s judgment (or the presupposition of
certain of its actions) that this particular sense is authoritative”90
But portraying Frei as Wittgensteinian in this distinctly Kripkensteinian way is not
helpful. For Frei, as for the “real” Wittgenstein, when agreement is at the level of the
practices, customs, and institutions, the community can be wrong or right about what
it takes to be the case. For what the community determines or takes to be the case in
its explicit agreement is accountable to the normative proprieties of the practices, cus-
toms, and institutions. But there is an additional level to consider here as well. Social
practices are object-directed. This means that human acting and meaning interweave
seamlessly with the objects in the world to which our sayings refer. This entails empiri-
cal and extensional components of accountability. Once a practitioner has become adept
in the practice, she is able to deal non-inferentially (directly, immediately, without need
to apply and justify the use of the concept) with the objects to which they refer. In
terms of the Scriptural practices that Frei works with, this observational immediacy is
analogous to the moment of explicatio. When Frei describes explicatio (observation) as the
ground level entry-point into the gospel narratives, he means that, for adept readers
and participants in the social practices of reading, consulting, studying scripture, using
it in worship, word and sacrament, the stories are directly accessible. In other words,
Wittgenstein’s account of the social practices of the community entails objectivity.
By contrast, the Kripkensteinian character of Knight’s rendering of Frei is evident
when he attributes the following positions to Frei:
“[T]he sensus literalis is the way the text has generally been used in the commu-
nity. It is the sense of the text in its sociolinguistic context—liturgical, pedagogical,
polemical, and so on.” Like Lindbeck, Frei here cites Wittgenstein as his inspira-
tion for his articulation of this third understanding of the literal sense. In the con-
text of the religious community, the way a text is used in a community just is the
teaching of the text that the community considers to be authoritative. . .Thus what
makes a particular sense of a biblical text the “literal” sense is whatever the
use—of the community” (Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 211). This positions Frei with a far more
hermetically demarcated and internally uniform account of the Christian tradition as a (Kripkensteinian)
“form of life” than Frei ever held. This also holds for Knight’s characterization of the “sensus literalis” as
what Knight alleges to be the “criterion” for meaning in that Christian form of life. Again, Fulford is
helpful on this point. See Ben Fulford, “Review of Liberalism versus Postliberalism,” Journal of Theological
Studies 65, no. 1 (2014): 363–67 (here 366).
90 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 208.
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community’s judgment (or the presupposition of certain of its actions) that this
particular sense is authoritative. And a particular sense will be authoritative in so
far as it enables the church to live out its mission. . ..Frei’s move to this third
understanding reveals his commitment to a Wittgensteinian understanding of
meaning. This third understanding of the literal sense gives to the community the
role of the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of any and all biblical texts. That mean-
ing is now indexed to the use of the text in the living out of the community’s mis-
sion. It is here that we can see most clearly the influence of the later Wittgenstein
as well as Frei’s theological kinship with Lindbeck.91
But Frei held no such view that a community’s use of a text “just is the teaching of
the text that the community considers to be authoritative,” a view that would indeed
make the community the “ultimate arbiter of the meaning of any and all biblical
texts.” To the contrary, Frei describes numerous constraints upon the church’s
engagements with scripture—constraints to which the “agreed use”92 of Christian
interpretive communities (what they take the texts to mean, or recognize as authori-
tative) are accountable. These include, for instance:
1. The grammatical/syntactical and literary-literal features of the text that resist and
press back upon reading and interpretation. On Frei’s account, sometimes widely-
ranging disagreements emerged among readers of Christian scripture precisely
because the scriptural text “resists” any attempt to exhaustively interpret it. “The
text,” Frei wrote, “is not inert but exerts a pressure of its own on the inquiring
reader. . .”93 Thus, “there can be no non-residual reading, no complete inter-
pretation” because a “good enough text has the power to resist.” For this reason,
when claims about the meaning of scripture conflict and inspire controversy, the
task of reading and consulting scripture required is not one where the readers take
a vote to see whose opinion wins the day. Rather, the task is one of sitting down
and holding each other accountable to “the features of the text,” as well as what
each reader is doing in engaging the text. These are all intimate features the prac-
tices of reading, consulting, and understanding scripture. Moreover, readers’
understandings and interpretations of these texts are accountable to those features.
Of course, non-Christians could hold Christians accountable to the features of
scriptural text as well, though they do not endorse its claims as their own.
2. “Historical reference” as a minimal threshold (indeed, ostensibly definitive) constraint
upon the community’s engagement with scripture, for instance, that the stories of
Jesus’ of Nazareth life as a historical person and execution have not been ultimately
disconfirmed by means of historical investigation (historie). Indeed, what scripture tes-
tifies as having happened then and there may have been, for example, fabricated by
the disciples. In that case, Frei confessed he would have given up being a Christian.
This is a claim that separated Frei from Barth. For Barth, “encounter with the living
Christ” made the possibility of historical disconfirmation a non-question.94
91 Ibid., 208, 209.
92 Ibid., 211.
93 Frei, Types, 86–7.
94 For expansion of this important difference between Barth and Frei, see Hunsinger, “The Daybreak
of the New Creation,” 179–80.
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3. Three senses in which the stories “mean what they say.” These are: a) in their
“storied sense,” b) as a “fit enactment” of what their authors intended, but also c)
with reference to what happened then and there.95 As Frei puts it, the name “Jesus
refers like any other name” to a person then and there. Moreover, the events por-
trayed in the gospel accounts of the resurrection must have happened— “more
nearly than not”—as they are witnessed to in Christian scripture.96 Note that here
we see the “signified subject” is an integral piece interwoven with the literary-
literal and grammatical-syntactical constraints, along with reference to use in con-
text. This is crucial, for it means that Frei does not simply hold together what he
calls “use in context” along with the normative constraints exerted by the constitu-
tive features of the text and practices of reading and interpretation. Equally impor-
tant is the text’s adequacy for rendering what is claimed to have happened then
and there. On this account, he says, the texts “mean what they say, so that their
subject is indeed the bodily resurrected Jesus.” On this account, “the miracle of the
resurrection. . .is [taken to be] a real event. . ..[though] human depiction and con-
ception are [ultimately] inadequate [to depict and account for it]. . .[T]he literal
description is the best that can be offered. . ..Text and reality are adequate, indeed,
indispensable to each other but not identical. . .” And again, he maintains: “[T]he
literal account of the text is adequate to the reality of the events by divine grace.”97
4. Christian communities’ practices of reading and consulting texts are accountable to
the Christological norm that emerged from their engagement with their source and
norm (e.g. the apostolic witness—a constraint upon what Christian communities
take scriptural texts to mean that I treat in Part III below).
95 I should note that I am traversing all too quickly a complex set of claims regarding the roles of tex-
tual and historical reference as constraints in Frei’s treatment of the literal sense. For a more extensive
discussion, see Jason Springs, Toward a Generous Orthodoxy, Chap. 4, “But Did it Really Happen?”. Frei’s
reliance upon historical reference is best described as an “ad hoc minimalism.” The position has been
ably explicated and defended in these terms by George Hunsinger, “What Can Evangelicals and
Postliberals Learn from Each Other?” in Disruptive Grace (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2000), 338–60 (especially 347–54). Knight acknowledges this discussion, but admits
that the concept of dual reference “remains confusing” for him. A slippage occurs in Knight’s reading on
this point a few lines later, where Knight imputes his own confusion to Frei: it becomes “Frei’s con-
fusion” (Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 258). The latter by no means follows from the former. Hunsinger’s
exposition of Frei’s account is, in my judgment (and that of many others), admirably clear and cogent. In
my view the discrepancy emerges in virtue of Knight viewing Frei as committed to, and motivated by, a
treatment of Wittgenstein that Frei did not hold.
96 “[The believer] would have to affirm that the New Testament authors were right in insisting that it
is more nearly correct to think of Jesus as factually raised, bodily if you will, than not to think of him in
this manner. (But the qualification ‘more nearly . . . than not’ is important in order to guard against specu-
lative explanations of the resurrection from theories of immortality, possibilities of visionary or auditory
experience, possibilities of resuscitating dead bodies, miracle in general, etc.” (Frei, Identity, 182). But
there is “breathing room” here as well. The accounts of Jesus are not straightforward historical reports.
As William Placher put it, “The stories capture through narrative a person’s identity. Reading these sto-
ries, one learns who Jesus is—that is, one learns both the characteristics of his human life and the fact
that that human life was somehow the self-revelation of God. Many of the episodes serve as biographical
anecdotes, ‘true’ if they illustrate his character authentically even though the particular incident they nar-
rate never happened, and the overall shape of the narrative portrays something of Jesus’ identity.”
William C. Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994),
92–7 (here 92, 93).
97Hans W. Frei, “Of the Resurrection of Christ,” Theology & Narrative: Selected Essays, edited by George
Hunsinger and William C. Placher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 203. Curiously, Knight does
not include in his treatment of Frei the important essay in which these claims appear.
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In a nutshell, the question of whether or not the events to which the resurrection
account witnesses really happened (or more nearly than not) exerts myriad, and
quite definitive, constraints on the interpretive community. This point subverts Carl
Henry’s claim that, for Frei, the biblical narrative is a self-contained, discrete world
that does not refer beyond itself (and, likewise, to what David Tracy and Gary
Comstock claimed to be Frei’s “pure narrativism”).98 Thus, while Frei does refuse
(for Christological reasons) a single, formal theory of meaning, it is not correct to say
that reference plays no role in what he does say about meaning. It is even less cor-
rect to base such an attribution upon his putative rejection of philosophical descripti-
vist accounts of meaning.99
The point in question for Knight’s Kripkensteinian portrayal of Frei is the nature
and force of communal authority in determining the meaning and significance of the
biblical witness. As Mike Higton argues, “precisely by taking a narrative reading as
primary rather than an allegorical or purely symbolic one, the Church allowed the
Bible to stand over against it as an independent norm which it could not control.”100
Notice the characterization of the norm as independent from what the community
might have agreed (or agrees) to be the case. Moreover, as an independent norm
scripture constrains what the Christian community takes these texts to mean. In
other words, the Christian community may collectively think that it is obeying the
rule, but not be. The community may be in agreement that it is following the
Christological norm, and yet be wrong about that.
But, yet again, we must not pass over Frei’s deep concern not merely with the fact
that some basic interpretation of the gospel accounts emerged as authoritative, but
how and why that interpretation became authoritative in the way that it did. We
must ask next, why did the Christian community take the literal sense101 as a norm
that both carved out broad space for, and stands in judgment over, multifarious
readings of scripture and often conflicting claims about the meanings of scriptural
passages? Was it a matter of chance that the community found this reading “useful”
for what it understood to be its “mission”?102 These questions bring us to the second
98 For a helpful treatment of these controversies that highlights the relevance of Frei’s Christologically
motivated use of ad hoc apologetics, see Jeffrey Stout, “Hans Frei and Anselmian Theology,” in Ten Year
Commemoration to the Life of Hans Frei (1922–1988), edited by Giorgy Olegovich (New York: Semenenko
Foundation, 1999), 24–40. For the charge of pure narrativism, see Gary Comstock, “Truth or Meaning:
Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative,” Journal of Religion 66 no. 2 (April 1986): 117–140; David Tracy,
Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-religious Dialogue (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1991), 201–210.
99 “[Y]es, ‘Jesus’ refers, as does any ordinary name, but ‘Jesus Christ’ in scriptural witness does not
refer ordinarily; or rather, it refers ordinarily only by the miracle of grace. And that means that I do not
know the manner in which it refers, only that the ordinary language in which it is cast will miraculously
suffice. It is historical reference (to use our cultural category) but it is not historical reference in the ordi-
nary way . . . nor of course is it metaphor.” Hans W. Frei, “Response to ‘Narrative Theology’,” Theology
and Narrative, 210, 212. Frei’s references to “ordinary language” here should not be read as an appeal to
“ordinary language philosophy.” It is not. His point is to emphasize the orientational role of a miracle of
grace in making the ordinary words of scripture adequate as a witness to Jesus Christ.
100Mike Higton, “Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory,” Scottish Journal of
Theology 50, no. 1 (1997): 83–95; at 92.
101 This is Frei’s compound conception of the literal sense as “not only as use-in-context but as unity
of grammatical/syntactical sense and signified subject [“literary-literal” or “storied sense” and—more
nearly factual than not—“the bodily resurrected Jesus”].” Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of
Narrative,” 110–11.
102 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 281–82.
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set of structural difficulties in Knight’s account—a series of misunderstandings of
Frei’s theology.
One problem of the meaning-as-use reductionism that Knight ascribes to Frei (in
his Kripkensteinian portrayal of him) is that it falls squarely into the trap that Frei
himself identified in the preface to his dissertation—of turning “thus sayeth the Lord
into thus heareth the man.”103 Frei, by contrast, says that the church, because it “is
accountable to God for its discourse about God,” must “undertake a critique and cor-
rection of her discourse in the light of the norm she sees as the presence of God to
the Church, in obedience to God’s grace.”104 In other words—and this point is
crucial—Frei does not simply reject “thus heareth the man” for a conception of “thus
sayeth the Lord,” as though scripture were like “a stone thrown down from
Heaven” (as Paul Tillich caricatured Barth’s account of revelation). Frei recognized
that there is no human access to God unmediated by human social practices (linguis-
tic, conceptual, sociological, historical and so forth). As George Hunsinger writes of
Barth, “Since all our language inevitably arises from and is formed by the human
and creaturely sphere, the question in speaking about God was not whether but how
to be ‘anthropomorphic’.”105 Frei’s career-long work can be viewed as a lengthy and
leisurely unfolding of this “but how.” The point is to avoid attempts to stand outside
history, human language, and human concepts, as well as attempts to flatly assimi-
late God to (“shoe-horn God into”106) human socio-linguistic practices. The result in
Frei’s case is a theological critical realism about scripture and the church as the
means in and through which God makes human social practices adequate for por-
traying God. And this renders the theological processes of critique and correction “in
the light of the norm she sees as the presence of God to the Church, in obedience to
God’s grace” a perpetually-unfolding inquiry (i.e. “following Jesus at a distance”).
This discourse of tradition persistently asks of itself: “Does Christian discourse come
from [God] and move toward [God], and is it in accordance with [God]?”107
Literal and Plain
It is important to be clear about what Knight means when he speaks of “literal read-
ing.” In my judgment, Knight’s account is not quite consistent with all that Frei says
about it. Knight ascribes to Frei the view that, whichever sense the community takes
to be authoritative becomes for that very reason “literal.”108 Yet to ascribe this defini-
tion of “literal sense” to Frei is to miss certain subtle (but crucial) distinctions that
Frei carefully makes throughout his writing.
103 Barth to Harnack as quoted in Hans W. Frei, “The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl
Barth, 1909–1922: The Nature of Barth’s Break with Liberalism” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1956).
104 Frei, Types, 39.
105 George Hunsinger, “Beyond Literalism and Expressivism,” Disruptive Grace, 215.
106 To borrow Kevin Hector’s colorful phrase. Hector sets forth a compelling account of Frei’s work
that I consider to be consistent with the reading I forward here. See Kevin W. Hector, “Postliberal
Hermeneutics: Narrative, Community, and the Meaning of Scripture,” The Expository Times 122 no. 3
(December, 2010): 105–116.
107 Frei, Types, 39.
108 “Thus what makes a particular sense of a biblical text the ‘literal’ sense is nothing other than the
community’s judgment (or the presupposition of certain of its actions) that this particular sense is author-
itative. And a particular sense will be authoritative insofar as it enables the church to live out its mis-
sion.” Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 208.
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First, Frei distinguishes between “plain sense” and “literal sense.” The sense that
some interpretive traditions in religious communities tend to reach consensus upon
as authoritative is what Frei calls the “plain sense.” The “literal sense” is one of the
four-fold sense of Scripture (literal, spiritual, analogical, anagogical). The early
church identified and grappled with these senses, and the literal sense became orien-
tational (entry-level for the others). The “literal sense” was later identified as
“adequately perspicuous” as a scriptural form of witness by the Protestant
Reformers.109 As a historical matter of fact, of the four-fold approaches to reading
scripture, the literal sense did emerge as authoritative from the early church forward.
As such, the literal sense became the “plain sense.”
Simple conflation of Frei’s uses of the terms “literal” and “plain” might appear to
be a minor error. The problem is that it neglects the important discussion that Frei
offers of these points. Specifically, it overlooks the considerable emphasis he places
on the complex process by which the “rule of faith” and “rule of truth” emerged in
the early church’s determining the scriptural canon in light of, and as consistent
with, the story of what Jesus did, and who Jesus was. Frei says that the literal sense
did not emerge as the plain sense for the early church as a matter of “logical neces-
sity.” Yet, it emerged nonetheless as that reading from which the rule of faith/rule
of truth derived. Moreover, the rule of truth and rule of faith stood as independent
norms over against Christian readings of scripture. That is, the rule of truth (as its
name indicates) further exerted constraints upon what could count as truthful and
faithful (note, not useful) readings of scripture. The literal sense became the plain
sense (i.e., the authoritative and traditional sense) because of what the literal sense
ascribes to Jesus—what it claims in witnessing to the lordship of Jesus Christ. In the
literal sense of scripture “the singular agent enacting the unity of human finitude
and divine infinity, Jesus of Nazareth, is taken to be itself the ground, guarantee,
and conveyance of the truth of the depicted enactment.”110 In other words, a precon-
dition for the community’s consensus that the literal sense ought to be plain was
that the text’s literal account ascribes the predicates that it does just to the person of
Jesus.111 As such, these accounts could be recognized as portraying the truth about
Jesus in accord with the apostolic witness (e.g. the centrality of “its sacred story, the
life, teachings, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth”).112 The primacy
accorded to the literal sense, Frei wrote elsewhere, reflects the church’s recognition
that these stories are adequate to portray this truth. It recognizes “the fitness and
congruence of the ‘letter’ to be the channel of the spirit.”113 This is what Frei means
when he says, “In interpreting conceptually and existentially, we are governed first
109 Frei describes these as follows: “There is the literal sense (what the text says), the allegorical sense
(what we believe), the tropical sense (what we must do), and there is the anagogical sense (what we
hope—or not hope).” Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” Theology & Narrative, 162.
110 Frei, “Literal Reading,” 143.
111 Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” 164–5. “I take that to be the basic sense of what one means in the
tradition of pre-critical New Testament interpretation as the ‘literal sense.’ That is, is it literally ‘about’
Jesus? Are certain descriptions literally ascribed, not are they literally descriptive, appropriately or
rightly, but do they have for their subject matter this storied person? Jesus, and none other or no person
but a concept? It is the literal ascriptiveness that is the basic sense of the literal it seems to me in the
Christian tradition.”
112 Frei, “Literal Reading,” 120
113 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 108.
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by the story and, in the second place, by the way it functions in the Christian
religion.”114
Knight’s account, by contrast, seems to get this relation backwards. If I understand
him correctly, Knight claims that whatever sense the community takes to be authori-
tative, in accord with what it understands to be its mission, becomes the literal sense.
In other words, on Knight’s reading, the preceding quotation from Frei ought to be
rephrased: “We are governed first by the way the reading functions in the Christian
religion and, in the second place, by the story.”115 Frei (following the account of
scriptural interpretation as explicatio, meditatio, applicatio) says the opposite—we are
governed “first, by the story and, in the second place, by how it functions in the
Christian religion.”116
Knight arrives at this characterization only after treating Frei’s exposition of three
accounts of the literal sense in Frei’s essay, “Theology and the Interpretation of
Narrative,” and then ascribing the third of these to him. But Frei never simply
endorses what he identifies as the third example of literal reading. This becomes
clearer by examining the different tasks that Frei takes up at different points in the
essay. For instance, in what Frei labels as Part II of the essay, he undertakes an
expository task of identifying the ways that the “literal sense” has been taken by
Christian communities. Only here does he identify the three senses of “literal sense”
that Knight makes so central to his reading of Frei.
As Knight points out, Frei says that “the third [sense of ‘literal sense’] is especially
closely related to theology in the second mode.”117 Yet, Knight takes this point to
constitute an unqualified endorsement of this third “literal sense.” Moreover, Frei
associates this “third sense” (i.e. “the way the text has generally been used in the
community. . .the sense of the text in its sociolinguistic context—liturgical, pedagogi-
cal, polemical, and so on”) with Wittgenstein: “This is the setting in which it is
appropriate to reach for that saying of Wittgenstein that has so often and wrongly
been given the status of a general principle.” However, to characterize the “third
sense” as “especially close” to the second mode of theology that Frei has in mind is
not to say that the third sense belongs unequivocally to the second mode. For, Frei
does not simply endorse this “third sense” of the literal sense outright and without
qualification. In fact, when he turns to Section III of the essay he makes his own case
for a particular account of the literal sense and explains the implications of such an
understanding. But here Frei articulates a conception of the sensus literalis that
expands upon what he had described as the “third sense” in Section II, that putative
“full-blown understanding of meaning-as-use” that Knight ascribes to Frei.118 In fact,
what Frei describes in Section III of his essay is best described as a complexly hybrid
account of the second sense and the third sense.119
114 Ibid., 113–14.
115 Ibid., 113–14, my transposition according to Knight’s description of the how the literal sense is
whichever sense the community takes to be authoritative.
116 Ibid., 114.
117 Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 103.
118 Knight, Liberalism versus Postliberalism, 268
119 Interestingly, Frei glosses this “third sense” in descriptive terms taken directly from Charles M.
Wood’s book The Formation of Christian Understanding: An Essay in Theological Hermeneutics (Philadelphia,
PA: Westminster Press, 1981). See Frei, “Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative,” 104–5. In taking
Frei to embrace unequivocally this “third sense” of the literal sense, Knight considers his invocation of
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What difference does this make? To identify the text as an object around which
scriptural practices cohere provides the basis on which Christian communities’ scrip-
tural practices are accountable to the features of the scriptural text, and thus, what
the scriptural text portrays. Scripture does this uniquely in the context of the
Christian community, for there it is recognized as scripture.120 This is to say—and
Frei clearly says—that the socio-linguistic context of the Christian church is the con-
text in which scripture takes on the uniquely authoritative significance that it has.
But Frei immediately points out that this relationship is “asymptotic.” What does he
mean by this? It means that to recognize this text as scripture is to recognize its
demand to submit to its claims and the content of what it says. And here we have
arrived at the intrinsically Christological orientation of Frei’s account of the literal
sense: to recognize this text as scripture means to recognize the demand to subordi-
nate oneself to what the text literally ascribes to this particular person Jesus—
”occurrences, teaching, personal qualities and religious attributes.”121 Here again, I
concur with Higton’s claim that, for Frei, the church’s taking the narrative reading of
the Bible as primary is not to say that “the Church mastered the Bible.” It is to say,
rather, that “precisely by taking a narrative reading [i.e. the literal sense] as primary
rather than an allegorical or purely symbolic one, the Church allowed the Bible to
stand over against it as an independent norm which it could not control.”122 But it
becomes an independent norm even over what various Christian readers take scrip-
tural texts to “mean.” Higton continues:
This isn’t just a contingent fact of history, said Frei. It came about precisely
because Christians looked to the unsubstitutable man Jesus of Nazareth as their
Wood further evidence of Frei’s dependence upon a Wittgensteinian understanding of meaning, because
Frei once called the dissertation upon which Wood’s book was based a “brilliant” exposition of Christian
scriptural practices using some of Wittgenstein’s terms (Knight, “Wittgenstein’s Web,” 337 n 3; 347 n 47).
Of course, Frei was often generous in his praise to a fault. So, it is equally important to recognize that
Frei was highly critical of Wood’s book as well. Moreover, he criticized that book precisely because he
thought it inadequately treated the constraints exerted by the content or object of Christian practices of
understanding and engaging scripture. “The aspect [Wood] treats well is the exercise of Christian under-
standing. . . The aspect he does not really treat is the content or object of Christian understandings, viz.,
what it is about, and the relation of the latter to the exercise of that understanding. While there may not
be any theory which adequately conceptualizes that relation between exercise and content, one responsi-
bility of both theology and hermeneutics is to insure that the integrity of both is preserved, and that the
appearance (or worse) of making one a vestigial appendage of the other at any point is avoided.” Higton
treats this point of criticism, and its significance in correcting the assimilation of Frei’s view to the “third
sense” of the literal sense in Mike Higton, Christ, Providence, and History (New York: T & T Clark, 2004),
200–206 (here 203).
120 The conception of scriptural practices Frei offers suggests that someone “outside” the Christian
community could read the text and make claims about it that might very well correct beliefs of the so-
called “insiders” concerning its proper meaning. Of course, Frei did not subscribe to the “insider/out-
sider” view of participation in the Christian communities, though Knight’s ascription of a hermetically
self-contained Christian “form of life” to Frei might imply as much. Frei spoke instead of the “pilgrim
self” who was perpetually in passage within and between belief and unbelief, even in her best efforts to
follow Jesus at a distance. See Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of
Dogmatic Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 69–71, 129–31.
121 Frei, “The ‘Literal Reading’ of Biblical Narrative,” Theology & Narrative, 145. Of course, one need
not be a Christian to recognize this text as Christian scripture. It is entirely possible for a non-Christian to
recognize that this text is taken to be scripture without endorsing that claim herself (this is the de re / de
dicto distinction). So claims about what the text ascribes to Jesus as scripture is not a claim that erects
anything like an insider/outside dichotomy.
122Higton, “Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory,” 92.
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source and norm, and so learned to read their scriptures in such a way as to take
them to be about that historically specific man. . ..[Moreover]. . .this narrative
reading is coherent with, informed by, and ultimately only intelligible on the
assumption of, an incarnational theology. . ..123
This passage sketches well the central Christological orientation that Frei strove both
to conceptualize and articulate over the course of his career. The Christian commun-
ity’s “recognition of the unsubstitutable man Jesus of Nazareth as their source and
norm” was not just “useful” within their brute or given “form of life.” Frei, rather,
saw this as their response—their being acted upon and gathered by Christ through
the work of the Holy Spirit. This recognition, of course, was a complex, socio-
historically situated process of discernment. It frequently occurred through debate
and contestation over what the Scriptural texts mean. In fact, says Frei, it was a rec-
ognition about which they could have been wrong.124
Indeed, those interpretations that came to be recognized as erroneous were con-
tested at length and, from time to time, rejected (or perhaps erroneously accepted).
In other words, the community’s “agreed use” was sometimes wrong, even though
it had been recognized as authoritative for the community members for some time.
But the community was anything but the “ultimate arbiter” of textual meaning
through its “agreed use” of the text. It was rather accountable to the norms of its
practices by which the text was deemed to be scripture in the first place.125 The
church argued about what the text says, and about how it ought to be interpreted—
and, in the end, all of them could be wrong. As Frei points out, the rules for faithful
or truthful reading that emerged in the early church “governed the Gospels’ use in
the church [and] asserted the primacy of their literal sense.”126 Such rules, while
largely informal, were not wholly so—they found formal encapsulation by the sec-
ond century in the “rule of faith” or “rule of truth.” And the deployment of these
rules, he says, constituted the church’s recognition of the normative priority of what
the text (in its literal sense) ascribed to the person and work of Jesus Christ.127 What
is most remarkable, however, is that this understanding of the literal reading took a
minimalist form that permitted remarkable wide-ranging disagreement and diversity
about the claims and meaning of scripture (and could include classical “liberal”
readings such as the quest for the historical Jesus).
But precisely here it is important to recall that Frei’s conception of the basic-ness
of the Christian community within which particular texts are recognized as scripture
differs from Wittgenstein’s in fundamental ways. For Frei, Christian community is
“given” only in the sense that it is gathered always and already in response to God’s
gracious initiative in the person and work (then and now) of Jesus Christ through
the work of the Holy Spirit. The Christian community is a community by virtue of
123 Ibid.
124 The point is not simply “that there were reasons” (as Knight puts it), but rather, that the reasons
were of a very specific sort, that the reasons (and norms) exerted a certain force independently of what
the community’s dispositions were, or even what the community believed to be the case.
125 Frei, Types, 86–7. But, again, notice that the object-directedness of the practice pertains to claims
about meaning (i.e. “our interpretations of a text”), and not simply questions of truth, contra Knight,
“Wittgenstein’s Web,” 357.
126 Frei, “Literal Reading,” 122–23.
127 Ibid., 122.
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being gathered by God, and in following Jesus. And this is why one cannot engage
Frei’s account of socio-linguistic context without recognizing the persistent
Christological basis and orientation that centers Frei’s work. This, I have argued, is
the primary warrant for the Christian community’s taking the literal sense to be the
plain sense, and thus the authoritative one.128 This conviction reaches beyond the
(Kripkensteinian) community level of agreement that Knight ascribes to Frei. But it
also reaches beyond the congruity at the background level of social practices and
empirical congruities which make explicit agreement possible, and to which that
agreement is accountable (Wittgenstein). This is what it means to deem Frei’s under-
standing of scriptural authority as Christologically determined and oriented.
Conclusion
Postliberal theology comprises a wide-ranging set of theological projects.129 Not all
of them make use of Wittgenstein’s work, nor need they. To appropriate
Wittgenstein for theological purposes is not without its risks: Wittgenstein’s later
work has inspired wide-ranging critical literatures and philosophical controversies.
Furthermore, not all readings of Wittgenstein are equal. And while Frei drew upon
Wittgenstein’s writings, he did not draw upon the Wittgenstein that Knight ascribes
to him (i.e. Kripkenstein).
Frei’s appropriations of theory were consistently delicate and ad hoc. His motiva-
tions were ultimately Christological at the same time his methodological work was
richly and diversely theoretical. Nonetheless, perhaps there is a cautionary lesson
here for any would-be postliberal theologian. For the philosophical controversies that
swirl around Wittgenstein’s work—though often deviating from what he actually
128On this point, I commend careful attention to the portion of my Toward a Generous Orthodoxy enti-
tled “No Matter How Philosophers May View It” (chap. 8, 177–81). “So, there is far more at stake here
than what the Christian community perceived to be beneficial, useful, or how the community decided to
use the biblical text.” This line follows on the heels of my quoting Frei’s claim that “the conveyance of
the truth of the depicted enactment” (for which “the singular agent enacting the unity of human finitude
and divine infinity, Jesus of Nazareth, is taken to be itself the ground, guarantee, and conveyance”) is
what is at stake for Frei. Knight eliminates my quotation of Frei that indicates what is at stake. Instead,
he positions my final statement of the paragraph (that there is, thus, more at stake than usefulness, bene-
ficiality) as a free standing claim, and then chastises me for “not saying what more is at stake” (Knight,
“Wittgenstein’s Web,”, 249–51). To restate this again, the “more” that is at stake—beyond communal use,
beneficiality, or usefulness, is God’s use of these to mediate the presence of Christ to the church through
the Spirit. As I point out there, following Frei, “While ’what the text says’ makes possible and warrants
predicate ascription to the person of Jesus it does not ultimately govern that predicate ascription. The
final warrant for seeing Jesus as the unsubstitutable ascriptive subject of the gospel narratives is the per-
son of Christ himself. This is not merely Christ as a narratively deposited character in the story. It is
Christ as the living person present even now. It is the person whose conscription of these concepts—as
well as the practices that make predication, storytelling, writing, reading, and meaning possible in the
first place—breaks and transforms them in order to thereby objectively, though analogically, mediate his
person to believers. This is the sense in which engaging Scripture is irreducibly social-practical but theo-
logically unique in kind. That is, while it is the text in and through which the literal sense is possible, it
is, according to Frei, the living and present person of Christ who governs—and thereby warrants—the
predicates ascribed to him in the literal sense of Scripture, not the consensus of the Christian community
(even consensus understood as congruity at the level of their practices)” (Toward a Generous Orthodoxy,
178). This is, I argue, the primary warrant for the Christian community’s taking the literal sense to be
plain (authoritative). It reaches beyond not only Knight’s (Kripkensteinian) community level of agree-
ment, but also the congruity at the background level of social practices which make possible explicit
agreement. This is the Christological feature of Frei’s understanding of scriptural authority.
129 See, for instance, Peter Ochs, Another Reformation: Postliberal Christianity and the Jews (Grand Rapids,
MI: Baker Academic, 2011).
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wrote— interpose a degree of risk. They risk distracting from the theological motiva-
tion and substance of the theologian’s work. In my view, Frei clearly avoided these
difficulties. In doing so, nonetheless, he demonstrates a great challenge facing post-
liberal theological method—the challenge to strike a delicate balance between the ori-
entational ground and goal of theology, and the eclectic and diverse approach to the
theoretical borrowing that will be necessary for theological tasks. Frei both recog-
nized and devoted much of his career to illuminating and enacting the fact that theo-
logians, church people, and scholars bring their antecedent categories and
presuppositions to the scriptural text. But if the theological task is truly to be captive
to the Lordship of Christ, then the unavoidable theoretical categories (philosophical,
anthropological, sociological, and so forth) must be oriented and ordered by the gra-
cious presence of Christ in the work of the Holy Spirit, and thus be deployed in ad
hoc ways.
Frei was not anti-theory. To the contrary, he saw it necessary to deploy whatever
theories might aid Christological aims. He tirelessly insisted that theory is indispen-
sable for theology—interposing the proviso, of course, that the inevitable, and indeed
necessary, uses of theory for theology remain secondary to recognizing that the con-
dition of theology’s possibility is always and already God’s action here and now
(again and again).
Thus we find Frei “plead[ing] for the primacy of the literal sense and the puzzling
but firm relationship to a truth toward which we cannot thrust.” Such a view does
not negate philosophical accounts of truth, meaning, or reference, in so far as such
an account may prove helpful to his Christological purposes and commitments. But
none can be established as “the necessary theory of meaning,” as a sine qua non for
the possibility of theology. As Frei put the point, “Any notion of truth [and we might
here exchange the word ‘truth’ for ‘meaning’ and/or ‘reference’] such that that con-
cept disallows the condescension of truth to the depiction in the text—to its self-
identification with, let us say, the fourfold story of Jesus of Nazareth taken as an
ordinary story—has itself to be viewed with profound skepticism by a Christian
interpreter.”130 In other words, the indispensable and inevitable uses of theory must
be adequately piecemeal and properly oriented to permit room for an understanding
in which “truth condescends to the text”—miraculously, mysteriously, and yet,
genuinely.131
130 Frei, “Conflicts in Interpretation,” Theology & Narrative, 164.
131 I am grateful to Ben Dillon, George Hunsinger, Martin Kavka, and Jeffrey Stout for their sugges-
tions and criticisms of earlier versions of this essay.
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